

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

**08 CV 01273**

MARKO BABIC, Individually and On  
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.,  
ROBERT J. GENADER, PHILLIP B.  
LASSITER, SEAN T. LEONARD and  
THOMAS J. GANDOLFO,

Defendants.

Civil Action No.

CLASS ACTION


COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF  
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a securities class action on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the securities, including call options, of Ambac Financial Group, Inc. ("Ambac" or the "Company") between October 19, 2005 and November 26, 2007 (the "Class Period"), against Ambac and certain of its officers and/or directors for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1924 ("1934 Act").

2. Ambac is a holding company whose subsidiaries provide financial guarantee products and other financial services to clients in both the public and private sectors around the world. The Company and its subsidiaries operate in two segments: financial guarantee and financial services. Ambac is headquartered in New York, New York.



3. Ambac was founded in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1971 and received an AA rating from S&P in 1979. In 1981, the Company's underwriting operations moved to New York City. Ambac is a monoline insurer ("monoline"), meaning that Ambac insures bonds that have been issued by other entities. Ambac purports to leverage its AAA financial strength rating to guarantee the timely repayment of bond principal and interest of an issuer in the event the issuer defaults, thus allowing the debt issued to get the highest possible rating. Ambac's financial guarantee is designed to protect investors in the event of securities default.

4. Ambac traditionally focused on conservation municipal bonds. However, in recent years, lured by larger profits and higher growth rates, Ambac began writing insurance on collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs"), including CDOs backed by subprime mortgages to higher-risk borrowers. CDOs are a type of asset-backed security and structured credit product. CDOs repackage bonds, mortgages and other assets into new securities and then use the income from the underlying debt to pay investors. CDOs are secured or backed by a pool of bonds, loans or other assets, where investors buy slices classified by varying levels of debt or credit risk.

5. During the Class Period, defendants issued materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company's business and financial results related to its insurance coverage on CDO contracts. As a result of defendants' false statements, Ambac stock traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period, reaching its all-time high of \$96.08 per share in May 2007.

6. As the real estate and credit markets continued to soften in 2007, defendants repeatedly assured Ambac investors that the Company had been very selective

in its underwriting standards in the past and maintained an adequate capital cushion to weather the deteriorating real estate and credit markets and maintain its AAA credit rating.

7. As late as the summer of 2007, as the housing and credit crisis deepened, defendants, continued to play down and conceal Ambac's growing exposure to these problems. As a result, Ambac's stock continued to be artificially inflated due to defendants' false statements.

8. Beginning in late July 2007, Ambac began to acknowledge serious deterioration in its CDO portfolio and indicated it has more exposure to anticipated losses and defaults related to its CDO contracts than previously represented.

9. On October 24, 2007, the Company issued a press release entitled "Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Announced Third Quarter Net Loss of (\$360.6 Million; Includes Previously Announced \$743 Million Unrealized mark-to-market loss on Credit Derivative Portfolio; Third Quarter net Loss Per Diluted Share of (\$3.51); Third Quarter Credit Enhancement Production \$431.1 million, up 99%." The press release stated in part:

**Ambac Financial Group, Inc.** (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced a third quarter 2007 net loss of (\$360.6) million, or (\$3.51) per diluted share. This compares to third quarter 2006 net income of \$213.5 million, or net income per diluted share of \$1.98. The decrease is due to the previously announced unrealized loss on credit derivative exposures amounting to (\$743.4) million, or (\$5.29) per diluted share in the third quarter 2007. The third quarter 2007 unrealized mark-to-market loss on credit derivative exposures was discussed in a press release dated October 10, 2007, and is primarily the result of unfavorable market pricing of collateralized debt obligations. As further described below, net mark-to-market losses on credit derivatives are excluded from the earnings measures used by research analysts.

**Net Income/(Loss) Per Diluted Share**

Net income/(loss) and net income/(loss) per diluted share are computed in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, many research analysts and investors do not limit their analysis of our earnings to a strictly GAAP basis. In order to assist investors in their understanding of quarterly results, Ambac provides other information.

Earnings measures reported by research analysts exclude the net income impact of net gains and losses from sales of investment securities and unrealized mark-to-market gains and losses on credit, total return and non-trading derivative contracts (collectively “net security gains and losses”) and certain other items. Certain research analysts and investors further exclude the net income impact of accelerated premiums earned on guaranteed obligations that have been refunded and other accelerated earnings (“accelerated earnings”). During the third quarter 2007, net security gains and losses had the effect of decreasing net income by (\$553.5) million, or (\$5.39) on a per diluted share basis. Accelerated earnings had the effect of increasing net income by \$9.6 million, or \$0.10 per diluted share during the quarter.

Commenting on the overall results, Ambac Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Robert J. Genader, noted, “We have observed improved overall market conditions in most asset classes of our core financial guaranty product, despite the recent turmoil in the structured finance markets. Business production during the quarter was quite robust, reflective of both a strong pipeline and better overall pricing in the current market.” Mr. Genader added, “With regard to the sizable mark-to-market adjustment recorded in the quarter, it is important to note that Ambac’s credit derivative contracts, like our insurance policies, are not exposed to the type of liquidity risk that is typically embedded in standard derivative contracts.”

**Loss Reserve Activity**

Case basis loss reserves (loss reserves for exposures that have defaulted) increased \$59.8 million during the third quarter of 2007 from \$47.3 million at June 30, 2007 to \$107.1 million at September 30, 2007. The increased case reserves relate primarily to two RMBS transactions that are underperforming original expectations. Total net claim receipts during the quarter amounted to \$3.7 million.

Active credit reserves (“ACR”) are established for probable and estimable losses due to credit deterioration on certain adversely classified insured transactions. The ACR decreased by \$37.0 million during the quarter, from \$203.7 million at June 30, 2007 to \$166.7 million at September 30, 2007. The reserve decline was driven by net favorable credit activity, primarily within the public finance portfolio, partially offset by increased reserves within the RMBS



sector of the structured finance portfolio.

### **Other Items**

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the third quarter of 2007 were (\$757.2) million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$4.2 million, net mark-to-market losses on credit and total return derivatives of (\$756.3) million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$5.1) million. During the quarter a net mark-to-market loss amounting to (\$743.4) million was recorded related to contracts executed in credit default format, primarily in our collateralized debt obligation exposures. The negative mark-to-market is driven by dramatically lower prices in certain structured finance asset classes. The lower prices were driven by uncertainty regarding the ultimate outcome of subprime losses. Reduced demand for certain structured asset classes, a lack of liquidity in the markets, forced selling by structured and/or leveraged investment vehicles, all combined to exacerbate pricing declines across the structured debt capital markets.

For the third quarter of 2006, net securities gains/(losses) were \$9.9 million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$7.9 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$2.1 million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$0.1) million.

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the first nine months of 2007 were (\$806.0) million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$12.0 million, net mark-to-market losses on credit and total return derivatives of (\$816.0) million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$2.0) million. For the first nine months of 2006 net securities gains were \$74.4 million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$57.5 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$16.5 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$0.4 million. Approximately \$51 million of the 2006 net realized gains on investment securities related to cash recoveries received during the year related to a security in the investment agreement portfolio that had been written down in previous years.

### **Balance Sheet Highlights**

Total assets as of September 30, 2007 were \$21.97 billion, up 8% from total assets of \$20.27 billion at December 31, 2006. The increase was primarily driven by cash generated from operations during the period, partially offset by a decrease in unrealized gains in the investment portfolio due to a rise in long-term interest rates.

As of September 30, 2007, stockholders' equity was \$5.65 billion, a 9% decrease from year-end 2006 stockholders' equity of \$6.18 billion. The decrease was

primarily the result of the \$400 million share buyback earlier in the year and lower Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income driven by higher long-term interest rates.

10. Upon this partial disclosure on October 24, 2007, Ambac's stock dropped \$4.90 per share to close at \$51.00 per share, a one-day decline of 9% on volume of 10.8 million shares, 3 times the average three-month volume. Ambac's stock continued to free-fall the following day as the news continued to disseminate into the market, closing at \$43.95 per share, \$7.05 per share less than the previous day, representing a one-day decline of 14% on volume of 16.4 million shares, over 4 times the average three-month volume. In total, in response to this revelation, Ambac's stock closed down \$11.95 per share, a two-day decline of 21% on extremely high volume.

11. Thereafter, in the next couple of weeks, as more of the truth about Ambac's financials and business outlook emerged, more of the artificial inflation in the Company's stock came out and the stock dropped even more.

12. On October 26, 2007, Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") cut the ratings on CDOs tied to \$33 billion of subprime mortgage securities. In some cases, CDOs with ratings as high as AAA were wither cut or put on review for downgrade.

13. On October 29, 2007, Fitch Ratings ("Fitch") announced that it had completed a comprehensive review of its CDOs and as a result it was placing 150 transactions tied to \$36.8 billion on Ratings Watch Negative, including CDOs with AAA ratings. The following day, Fitch announced that it would be revising its entire methodology for rating CDOs and indicated that it expected to publish the new methodology the following week.

14. On November 1, 2007, Fitch announced that due to the deterioration in the subprime market the U.S. Corporate bond downgrades hit their highest quarterly level in two-years – downgrades totaled \$92.1 billion in the third quarter of 2007. According to Fitch, S&P's, Moody's and Fitch had cut ratings on approximately 7,800 bonds backed by residential mortgage backed securities sold in 2006 and had cut ratings on another 3,700 bonds sold in 2005 and 2007.

15. Further, on November 1, 2007, Ambac's bonds were downgraded to "deteriorating" from "stable" by bond research firm Gimme Credit Publications Inc. due to Ambac's exposure to CDOs. The downgrade was based upon the recent ratings' cuts made by the credit-ratings companies for the mortgage-backed bonds and CDOs. As *Bloomberg* reported:

"The share drop in the stock price at MBIA and Ambac raises questions about whether the turmoil in the markets is hurting franchise value," said Kathleen Shanley, an analyst [in Chicago] at [bond research firm] Gimme Credit, in an e-mail. "The financial guaranty business relies heavily on the confidence of investors that the guarantees will be money-good, and if clients begin to doubt this premise, there will be negative implications for the new business outlook going forward."

Ambac has insured about \$29 billion of CDOs whose assets are more than a quarter mortgage-backed securities, "relatively more" than MBIA,...Gimme Credit said in a report today. CDOs are created by packaging bonds, loans or derivatives and using their income to pay investors.

16. Upon this news, Ambac's shares lost another \$7.26 per share to close at \$29.57 per share, a one-day decline of 20% on volume of 23.7 million shares, over 5.5 times the average three-month volume.

17. On November 2, 2007, further based upon the number of downgrades of CDOs by the credit rating agencies and other recent industry news, including the announcement of massive write-downs by companies associated with Ambac, Morgan

Stanley lowered the financial guarantee industry to “in-line” from “attractive” and Goldman Sachs cut its ratings on Ambac to “neutral” from “buy.” The Morgan Stanley report raised concerns that additional losses at Ambac could force the Company to raise capital to protect its AAA rating.

18. Upon this news, Ambac’s shares collapsed, losing another \$6.06 per share to close at \$23.51 per share, a one-day decline of 20.5% on volume of 29.9 million shares, over 7 times the average three-month volume.

19. On November 5, 2007, Fitch announced its new methodology in assessing financial guarantors CDOs and further announced that it would be reviewing the capital of the monolines, including Ambac, to ensure that they had enough capital to warrant their AAA rating. As a result of the ongoing review, Ambac faced a “moderate” risk of falling beneath the capital requirements necessary to keep its AAA rating, which would result in either a potential rating downgrade or force the Company to raise more capital. The review was expected to last six weeks.

20. On November 6, 2007, in an attempt to keep Ambac’s stock from free falling, the Company issued a press release entitled “Ambac’s Response to Morgan Stanley’s Report On Financial Guarantors – Dated November 2, 2007,” which stated in part:

**“Questions Arise on Mark to Market Losses”**

On page 6 the analyst states, “One of the first negative surprises we saw last week stemmed from the large discrepancy between the mark-to-market losses reported by the financial guarantors and Merrill Lynch.”

**Management Comment:**

It is difficult for us to comment on the Merrill Lynch mark-to-market loss as we do not have any visibility into their transactions. Without such details on Merrill’s book, one can only speculate as to the difference in the portfolios.



Several differences may exist between exposures contained in Ambac's portfolio and in investment bank's portfolio and therefore may influence the estimated mark of the different portfolios. For example, we have noted that later vintage high-grade ABS CDOs (particularly those with 2007 and late 2006 vintage underlying collateral) and high-grade ABS CDOs that have large inner CDO components, have suffered more severe mark-to-market losses. Additionally, as one might expect, the amount of first loss subordination and credit migration triggers present in a structure also can impact the market value of the senior tranche. Finally, the terms of the contract may also impact the estimate of fair value. Ambac's Credit Default Swap ("CDS") contracts are highly modified from a standard CDS used by investment banks. Ambac CDS contracts do not include collateral posting provisions, and are generally limited to payment shortfalls of interest and principal. Ambac's contract terms are significant variations from standard CDS contracts and have significant value, particularly in difficult markets. In fact, certain investment banks will not enter into an Ambac CDS due to the favorable nature (towards Ambac) of its terms.

Some background on Ambac's mark-to-market follows. The mark-to-market unrealized loss is an estimate of our CDS contracts' "fair value." It is an estimate because our CDS contract does not trade in any market. Under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, CDS contracts must be recorded at fair value. Fair value is defined broadly as the price that a contract could be settled in a current transaction between willing parties, other than in a forced or liquidation sale.

Because an estimate of fair value of a CDS contract includes many market factors, an unrealized loss may not result in an increased expectation of loss. A good example of this dynamic is a general decline in the level of liquidity (witnessed by fewer buyers in the market) for a particular asset or asset class. Ambac believes that only through rigorous analytics of the actual transaction and its attributes and protections, as well as performance to date and expected future performance of underlying collateral, will one obtain meaningful information on the potential for actual losses.

Most all major financial institutions are struggling with this issue. Particularly institutions where the process of marking-to-market is a critical part of operations, such as those that need to calculate required collateral postings. We are subject to information that we received from market participants, which are primarily comprised of major investment banking institutions. Given the lack of liquidity in the market, the potential for CDO downgrading activity by the rating agencies, the potential for forced selling by other investors (due to downgrades), and the overall uncertainty surrounding the ultimate outcome of the subprime mortgage market, Ambac does expect significant volatility in the mark-to-market of its CDO portfolio for the foreseeable future.

**“CDO Downgrades Have Started”**

On pages 6 and 7, the analyst discusses the recent internal rating downgrades of certain ABS and CDOs. He states: “If they were to downgrade the securities further, we would be highly disappointed and expect investor confidence in management to be strained.”

**Management Comment:**

Ambac has a rigorous surveillance process surrounding its entire book of business. Management has subjected the mortgage and ABS CDO books to more frequent and more detailed reviews in the current environment. We believe this is prudent and responsible given the current stressed credit environment surrounding the mortgage market. While Ambac underwrites its transactions to withstand significant stress, the underlying credit rating is impacted by expected unfavorable collateral performance. To date, the downgrades noted in the subject transactions are within the parameters of Ambac’s original stress tests. Ambac’s independent Surveillance and Risk Management group determine the deal ratings. The ratings are based on the performance observed to date and a projection of future performance of the underlying collateral. Given the significant stress in the mortgage market, it should not be surprising that there have been downgrades. We are highly confident in our ratings process. Over time, as new information becomes available and as performance data is analyzed, we will adjust ratings up or down accordingly.

**“Increasing our Exception of CDO Losses”**

The analyst states: “We are increasing our CDO loss expectations for both Ambac and MBIA to reflect an updated tally of various market opinions about cumulative subprime losses.”

**Management Comment:**

It appears that the “various market opinions” referred to in the analyst’s report relate to the 2006 and early 2007 vintage subprime. It also appears that he is assuming that the Ambac ABS CDO book will reflect the performance of the ABX index of 2006 and 2007 vintage subprime collateral and ignores the actual vintage diversification and asset quality triggers inherent in Ambac’s book. We see wide differences in the market regarding the estimate of ultimate cumulative loss for the 2006 and 2007 vintage. We typically hear a range from 8% to 17% with a wide dispersion around the mean. We understand the three major rating agencies recently reported estimates with significant differences dependent upon vintage. There were notable differences between the first half of 2006 and more recent vintages. We believe this is a critical point that is missed by simply applying a broad 15% estimated cumulative loss across the book of business. It does not compensate for vintage dispersion inherent in our transactions, nor does

it factor in different rating and FICO segmentation. Additionally, many of the ABS CDOs contain 2005 vintage mortgages, including Ambac transactions that were underwritten in 2007. That vintage is performing significantly better than 2006 and 2007. This illustrates the over simplification of applying a single cumulative loss across the board.

### **“Becoming More Conservative with Capital”**

The analyst states, “we can not help but think that if management truly believed that losses are unlikely, they would be willing to make a stronger statement with how they manage their capital (i.e. increased share buybacks).”

### **Management Comment:**

As management has stated many times in the past, Ambac manages its capital levels to a triple-A standard. That requires us to be very cautious with capital levels particularly in times of credit stress. For instances, a transaction rated AA will attract more capital than a similar transaction rated AAA. It is unlikely claims will be paid under either transaction. The global capital markets and virtually all major financial institutions are in the midst of a major credit and liquidity crunch. There is uncertainty regarding the ultimate outcome of losses in the U.S. mortgage market, concerns over leveraged investment vehicles and overall concern that the problems surrounding the mortgage market will adversely impact other sectors of the economy. Such an environment has caused credit spreads in many sectors to widen significantly. This environment provides both opportunities and limitations for Ambac. With regard to opportunities, returns on business written are up sharply in many sectors and we have seen a notable increase in attractive opportunities to put our capital to work for our shareholders. With regard to limitations, the market environment has caused some fixed income investors to have increased concern about the financial guaranty industry. As a result, all of the major participants in the industry have seen their credit spreads widen significantly. We believe applying capital to high return business and at the same time maintaining a stronger balance sheet by holding off on share repurchases is a responsible course in the current environment and one that meets our objective of managing our capital consistent with a triple-A standard. We believe this prudent strategy is good for both our equity and fixed income investors and will help restore confidence in our industry.

### **Summary comment:**

We certainly understand the heightened concerns summarized in the analyst’s report. Most all participants in the financial markets, including Ambac have a heightened concern over the ultimate outcome of the U.S. mortgage market. However, we are confident in the quality of our internal credit ratings

process. We have been very transparent to the market and our investors by disclosing significant detail on our direct mortgage and CDO exposure in our various public disclosures. We have a rigorous and current review and rating process in place and we will react quickly as projected collateral performance changes.

21. This release calmed the market somewhat and Ambac's stock closed on November 6, 2007 at \$27.99 per share.

22. On November 8, 2007, Moody's announced that it intended to conduct a similar review of the capital of the monolines and that as a result Ambac faced a "moderate" risk of falling behind the capital requirements and risked a potential ratings downgrade.

23. Finally, on November 27, 2007, executives from Ambac, including defendant Sean T. Leonard, spoke at Banc of America Securities bond issuer conference. At the conference, Ambac announced that it was considering raising capital through reinsurance or sales of debt or stock in order to maintain the Company's AAA rating.

24. Upon this news, Ambac's shares once again collapsed, losing another \$2.23 per share to close at \$21.79 per share, a one-day decline of 9.3% on volume of 12.3 million shares, approximately twice the average three-month volume. ***This price represented the lowest closing price in Ambac's stock in over a decade.***

25. The true facts, which were known by defendants but concealed from the investing public during the Class Period, were as follows:

(a) The Company lacked requisite internal controls to ensure that the Company's underwriting standards and its internal rating systems for its CDO contracts were adequate, and, as a result, the Company's projections and reported results issued during the Class Period were based upon defective assumptions and/or manipulated facts;



(b) The Company's financial statements were materially misstated due to its failure to properly account for its mark-to-market losses;

(c) Given the deterioration and the increased volatility in the mortgage market, the Company would be forced to tighten its underwriting standards related to its asset-backed securities, which would have a direct material negative impact on its premium production going forward.

(d) The Company had far greater exposure to anticipated losses and defaults related to its CDO contracts containing subprime loans, including even highly rated CDOs, than it had previously disclosed;

(e) The Company had far greater exposure to a potential ratings downgrade from one of the credit rating agencies than it had previously disclosed; and

(f) Defendants' Class Period statements about the Company's selective underwriting practices during the 2005 through 2007 time frame related to its CDOs backed by subprime assets were patently false, the Company's underwriting standards were at best aggressive and at minimum were completely inadequate.

26. As a result of defendants' false statements, Ambac's stock price traded at inflated levels during the Class Period, allowing defendants to sell some \$68 million worth of their Ambac stocks at inflated prices. However, after the above revelations seeped into the market, the Company's shares were hammered by massive sales, sending them down more than 77 % from their Class Period and all time high of \$96.08 per share in May 2007.



### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

27. This action arises under sections 10(b) and 209a) of the Exchange Act as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.

28. This Court has jurisdiction over this subject matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, and Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.

29. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to Section 27 of the Exchange Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Ambac’s principal executive offices are located at One State Street Plaza, New York, New York, in this district. Additionally, many of the false and misleading statements were made in or issued from this District.

### **PARTIES**

30. Plaintiff, Marko Babic, purchased Ambac options as described in the attached certification and was damaged thereby.

31. Defendant Ambac is a holding company whose subsidiaries provide financial guarantee products and other financial services to clients in both the public and private sectors around the world. The Company and its subsidiaries operate in two segments: financial guarantee and financial services. Ambac provides financial guarantees for public finance and structured finance obligations through its principal operating subsidiary, Ambac Assurance Corporation (“Ambac Assurance”). Through its financial services subsidiaries, the Company provides financial and investment products, including investment agreements, funding conduits, interest rate, currency and total return swap, principally to its clients of the financial guarantee business.

32. Defendant Robert J. Genader (“Genader”) is, and at all relevant times was, a director, President and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Ambac, and since July 2006 has been Chairman of the Board. Genader additionally serves as Chairman, President and CEO of Ambac Assurance. During the Class Period, Genader was responsible for the Company’s false and financial statements and reaped proceeds of \$26.4 million by selling his Ambac stock.

33. Defendant Phillip B. Lassiter (“Lassiter”) was, at relevant times, Chairman of the Board and CEO of Ambac from July 1991, until January 2004 and Chairman until his retirement in July 2006. Lassiter remains as a director of the Company. During the Class Period, Lassiter was responsible for the Company’s false financial statements, and reaped proceeds of \$40.6 million by selling his Ambac stock.

34. Defendant Sean T. Leonard (“Leonard”) is, and at all relevant times was, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of Ambac and Ambac Assurance. During the Class Period, Leonard was responsible for the Company’s false financial statements and reaped proceeds of \$1.9 million by selling his Ambac stock.

35. Defendant Thomas J. Gandolfo (“Gandolfo”) is, and at all relevant times was, Senior Managing Director of Ambac and Ambac Assurance. Gandolfo also serves as head of Global Structured Credit, Derivative Products, Fixed Income Investment Management and Risk Transfer groups of Ambac. Defendant Gandolfo joined Ambac in 1994. During the Class Period, Gandolfo was responsible for the Company’s false financial statements and reaped proceeds of nearly \$1.9 million by selling his Ambac stock.

36. Defendants Genader, Lassiter, Leonard and Gandolfo (the “Individual Defendants”), because of their positions with the Company, possessed the power and authority to control the contents of Ambac’s quarterly reports, press releases and presentations to securities analysts, money and portfolio managers and institutional investors, *i.e.*, the market. They were provided with copies of the Company’s reports and press releases alleged herein to be misleading prior to or shortly after the issuance and had the ability and opportunity to prevent their issuance or cause them to be corrected. Because of their positions with the Company, and their access to material non-public information available to them but not to the public, the Individual Defendants knew that the adverse facts specified herein had not been disclosed to and were being concealed from the public and that the positive representations being made were then materially false and misleading. The Individual Defendants are liable for the false statements pleaded herein at ¶¶ 39 – 49, 51, 53 – 54 and 66.

#### **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

37. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all those who purchased or acquired the securities, including the call options, of Ambac from October 19, 2005 to November 26, 2007, inclusive, and who were economically damaged thereby. Excluded from the Class are defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, members of the immediate families of any excluded person, the legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns of any excluded person, and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest.

38. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Ambac had over 101.55 million shares of its securities outstanding. Its securities are actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Ambac or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions.

39. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members were similarly impacted by the wrongful conduct complained of herein.

40. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation.

41. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:

- (a) Whether defendants' acts violated the federal securities laws;
- (b) Whether statements made by defendants to the investing public during the Class Period misrepresented material facts about the business, operations and management of Ericsson; and
- (c) To what extent the members of the Class have sustained damages and the proper measure of damages.

42. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action

#### **FRAUDULENT SCHEME AND COURSE OF BUSINESS**

43. Defendants are liable for: (i) making false statements; or (ii) failing to disclose adverse facts known to them about Ambac. Defendants' fraudulent scheme and course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of Ambac common stock was a success, as it: (i) deceived the investing public regarding Ambac's prospects and business; (ii) artificially inflated the price of Ambac securities; (iii) allowed defendants Genader, Lassiter and Gandolfo to sell over \$68 million worth of their own Ambac stock at artificially inflated prices; and (iv) caused plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Ambac securities at inflated prices. While Ambac's insiders were unloading \$68 million in stock, defendants were causing the Company to repurchase millions of dollars of Ambac stock on the open market.

#### **BACKGROUND**

44. Ambac provides financial guarantee products and other financial services to clients in the public and private sectors worldwide. Ambac provides financial guarantees for public finance and structured finance obligations through its principal operating subsidiary, Ambac Assurance. Ambac operates in two segments: financial guarantee and financial services. The financial guarantee segment offers financial



guarantee insurance and other credit enhancement products, such as credit derivatives for public finance and structured finance obligations. It also provides financial guarantees for bond issues and other forms of debt financing. This segment sells its products in the U.S. public finance market, the U.S. structured finance and asset-backed market, and the international finance market. The financial services segment provides financial and investment products comprising investment agreements, funding conduits, interest rate, currency, and total return swaps, principally to clients of the financial guarantee business, which includes municipalities and other public entities, health care organizations, investor-owned utilities, and asset-backed issuers.

#### **DEFENDANTS' FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS ISSUED DURING THE CLASS PERIOD**

45. On October 19, 2005, Ambac issued its financial results for the third quarter of 2005 in a release which stated in part:

**Ambac Financial Group, Inc.** (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced third quarter 2005 net income of \$175.1 million, or \$1.61 per diluted share. This represents a 5% decrease from third quarter 2004 net income of \$183.5 million, and a 2% decrease in net income per diluted share from \$1.65 in the third quarter of 2004. The third quarter 2005 results were negatively impacted by a loss provision amounting to \$60.0 million on an after-tax basis, or \$0.55 per diluted share, related to its exposure to municipal finance credits impacted by Hurricane Katrina.

#### **Net Income Per Diluted Share**

Net income and net income per diluted share are computed in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, many research analysts and investors do not limit their analysis of our earnings to a strictly GAAP basis. In order to assist investors in their understanding of quarterly results, Ambac provides other information.

Earnings measures reported by research analysts typically exclude the net income impact of net gains and losses from sales of investment securities and mark-to-market gains and losses on credit, total return and non-trading derivative contracts (collectively "net security gains and losses") and certain non-recurring and other

items. Certain research analysts and investors further exclude the net income impact of accelerated premiums earned on guaranteed obligations that have been refunded and other accelerated earnings (“accelerated earnings”). During the third quarter 2005, net security gains and losses had the effect of increasing net income by \$8.8 million, \$0.08 on a per diluted share basis. Accelerated earnings had the effect of increasing net income by \$28.5 million, or \$0.26 per diluted share for the third quarter 2005. Table I, below, provides third quarter and nine-month comparisons of earnings for the years 2005 and 2004.

Commenting on the overall results, Ambac President and Chief Executive Officer, Robert J. Genader, noted, “Our operating results, excluding the \$0.55 per share impact of Hurricane Katrina, were pretty good considering the tight credit spreads and increased competition that have persisted during the past 18 months. Domestic top-line production in both public and structured finance was encouraging, with attractive deals closed in a wide array of sectors. European booked business was sparse despite strong activity and growing pipelines – it remains a lumpy and less predictable business flow with long lead times.” Mr. Genader continued, “The story of the quarter was Hurricane Katrina and the physical destruction and human suffering that it wrought. While early in the assessment process, we have completed a detailed loss analysis using the best information we could develop. By its very nature, it will be an evolving situation which will require and get our full attention on surveillance and active remediation. On a positive note, the balance of our risk portfolio showed improvement.”

## **Revenues**

### ***Highlights***

*Credit enhancement production* in the third quarter of 2005 was \$256.6 million, down 6% from the third quarter of 2004 which came in at \$273.7 million. Growth in U.S. public finance was more than offset by a decline in production in U.S. structured finance and international.

*Credit enhancement production* for the nine months of 2005 of \$853.5 million was 10% lower than credit enhancement production of \$943.6 million in the same period of 2004 primarily driven by tighter credit spreads across many of the markets that Ambac serves.

*Net premiums earned and other credit enhancement fees* for the third quarter of 2005 were \$231.1 million, which represented an 18% increase from the \$195.3 million earned in the third quarter of 2004. Net premiums earned increased for all market sectors but was most significant in U.S. public finance where accelerated premiums were very strong during the quarter.

Net premiums earned include accelerated premiums, which result from refundings, calls and other accelerations recognized during the quarter.

Accelerated premiums were \$48.9 million in the third quarter of 2005 (which had a net income per diluted share effect of \$0.26), up 133% from \$21.0 million (\$0.11 per diluted share) in accelerated premiums in the third quarter of 2004. The third quarter 2005 was impacted by one large refunded transaction, representing almost half of the total accelerated amount. Long-term interest rates have remained relatively low during 2005 and we continue to see strong refunding activity in our public finance segment. However, as interest rates rise, the level of accelerated premiums should decline.

*Net premiums earned and other credit enhancement fees* for the nine months of 2005 were \$648.6 million, which represented a 13% increase from \$573.6 million earned in the nine months of 2004. Accelerated premiums were \$107.9 million for the nine months of 2005 (\$0.56 per diluted share), up 56% from \$69.2 million (\$0.35 per diluted share) in accelerated premiums for the nine months of 2004. Accelerated premiums in 2005 include the impact of a reinsurance cancellation in the first quarter of 2005 amounting to \$4.5 million. Accelerated premiums in 2004 include the impact of reinsurance cancellations in the second quarter of 2004 amounting to \$10.4 million.

*Net investment income* for the third quarter of 2005 was \$110.6 million, representing an increase of 22% from \$90.5 million in the comparable period of 2004. Net investment income excluding net investment income from Variable Interest Entities ("VIEs") for the third quarter of 2005 was \$98.5 million, representing an increase of 10% from \$89.6 million in the third quarter of 2004. This increase was due primarily to the growth in the investment portfolio driven by ongoing collection of financial guarantee premiums and fees and a net positive adjustment to investment income for certain municipal securities within the investment portfolio that have been pre-refunded. A pre-refunding shortens the maturity of a bond resulting in accelerated amortization of bond premium or discount. These positive effects on investment income during the period were partially offset by a lower reinvestment rate and use of cash for repurchases of Ambac stock during 2005 totaling approximately \$300 million. Net investment income from VIEs for the third quarter of 2005 was \$12.1 million, up from \$0.9 million in the third quarter of 2004. Investment income from VIEs results from the consolidation of certain trusts that Ambac has insured and consolidated under accounting pronouncement FIN 46. The increase in interest income from VIEs reflects the consolidation of two transactions executed in the fourth quarter of 2004. Investment income from VIEs is offset by interest expense on VIEs, shown separately in the Consolidated Statements of Operations.

*Net investment income* (including net investment income from VIEs) for the nine months of 2005 was \$317.1 million, representing an increase of 19% from \$267.1 million in the comparable period of 2004, primarily as a result of the reasons provided above.

### **Loss Reserve Activity**



Case basis loss reserves (loss reserves for exposures that have defaulted) decreased \$3.7 million during the third quarter of 2005 from \$86.6 million at June 30, 2005 to \$82.9 million at September 30, 2005.

Active credit reserves (“ACR”) are established for probable and estimable losses due to credit deterioration on insured transactions that are considered adversely classified. Ambac continuously monitors its insured portfolio actively seeking to mitigate claims. The ACR increased by \$79.3 million during the quarter, primarily as a result of municipal exposures to the region impacted by Hurricane Katrina. Ambac’s exposure to losses as a result of the hurricane is derived primarily from its guarantees of municipal bonds in the greater New Orleans area and the Gulf-front regions that were most severely impacted by the storm. The company has classified 35 individual obligations in the region with total net par outstanding of approximately \$1.1 billion. To date, Ambac has paid three claims on obligations in the region, totaling approximately \$2.0 million and has subsequently recovered the full amounts. In determining our loss estimate, our analysis has considered the unprecedented nature of the disaster, including the displacement of the communities’ residents, and the unique aspects of each insured bond, such as the nature of the revenue source, the level of debt service reserves, if any, and other transaction protections. Ambac’s estimate of losses related to the hurricane was made without regard to any potential federal, state or local government assistance to individual municipalities or institutions. The credit loss estimation process involves the exercise of considerable judgment. Due to the nature of the loss reserve estimate, Ambac’s ultimate actual loss associated with the hurricane may be materially different than the current estimate and thereby may affect future operating results. Ambac will continue to assess the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the fourth quarter and subsequent periods as more information becomes available to us. Ambac does not have material exposure to credits adversely affected by Hurricane Rita. Outside of the ACR activity related to the hurricane, the remaining portfolio experienced slightly favorable credit migration during the quarter.

### **Other Items**

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the third quarter of 2005 were \$14.5 million on a pre-tax basis, or \$0.08 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$9.5 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$3.9 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$1.1 million. For the third quarter of 2004, net securities gains/(losses) were \$10.1 million on a pre-tax basis, or \$0.06 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$6.6 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$3.0 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$0.5 million.

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the nine months of 2005 were \$53.1 million, or \$0.27 per diluted share, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$10.8 million, net mark-to-market losses on credit and total return derivatives of (\$7.0) million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$49.3 million. As discussed in the previous quarter, the mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts related almost entirely to interest rate hedge contracts related to long-term fixed rate liabilities in Ambac's investment agreement business that were highly effective from an economic perspective but did not meet the technical requirements of FAS 133. As of July 1, 2005, the hedges were redesignated to meet the technical requirements and it is expected that the mark-to-market of the hedge and hedged item will substantially offset each other in the income statement prospectively. For the nine months of 2004 net securities gains were \$29.3 million, or \$0.17 per diluted share, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$27.6 million, mark-to-market gains on credit derivatives and total return swaps of \$15.2 million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$13.5) million.

### **Balance Sheet Highlights**

Total assets as of September 30, 2005 were \$19.06 billion, up 2% from total assets of \$18.74 billion at December 31, 2004. The increase was driven by cash generated from business written during the period offset by a decrease in the unrealized gains in the investment portfolio driven by higher long-term interest rates and stock repurchases during the period. As of September 30, 2005, stockholders' equity was \$5.19 billion, a 3% increase from year-end 2004 stockholders' equity of \$5.02 billion. The increase was primarily the result of net income during the period, offset by lower "Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income," driven by higher long-term interest rates and stock repurchases during the period.

(Footnote omitted.)

46. On November 29, 2005, Ambac announced an offering of \$400 million of 30-year Debentures, in a release that stated in part:

Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (Ambac) announced today the offering of \$400 million of 5.95% Debentures due December 5, 2035.

The Debentures are rated at a slight discount to par.

The Debentures are rateAa2 by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and are rated AA by Standard and Poor's Ratings Services.



The Company intends to use the proceeds for general corporate purposes and the redemption of all or a portion of the outstanding \$200 million 7.00% Debentures due in 2051, on or after its first call date in October 2006.

Citigroup, Goldman Sach & Co. and Merrill Lynch & Co. acted as joint lead managers for the underwriting syndicate.

47. On January 25, 2006, Ambac issued its fourth quarter 2005 financial results in a release that stated in part:

Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced fourth quarter 2005 net income of \$204.3 million, or \$1.90 per diluted share. This represents an 8% increase from fourth quarter 2004 net income of \$188.8 million, and a 12% increase in net income per diluted share from \$1.69 in the fourth quarter of 2004.

#### **Net Income Per Diluted Share**

Net income and net income per diluted share are computed in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, many research analysts and investors do not limit their analysis of our earnings to a strictly GAAP basis. In order to assist investors in their understanding of quarterly results, Ambac provides other information.

Earnings measures reported by research analysts exclude the net income impact of net gains and losses from sales of investment securities and mark-to-market gains and losses on credit, total return and non-trading derivative contracts (collectively “net security gains and losses”) and certain non-recurring and other items. Certain research analysts and investors further exclude the net income impact of accelerated premiums earned on guaranteed obligations that have been refunded and other accelerated earnings (“accelerated earnings”). During the fourth quarter 2005, net security gains and losses had the effect of increasing net income by \$13.2 million, \$0.12 on a per diluted share basis. Accelerated earnings had the effect of increasing net income by \$20.3 million, or \$0.19 per diluted share for the fourth quarter 2005. Table I, below, provides fourth quarter and full year comparisons of earnings for 2005 and 2004.

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Commenting on the overall results, Ambac President and Chief Executive Officer, Robert J. Genader, noted, “Our top-line credit enhancement production results are encouraging as we successfully closed a wide array of transactions during the quarter, including a few deals of significant size. Overall, market conditions remain challenging, yet our experienced professionals continue to

identify new and attractive opportunities across a broad spectrum of asset classes and geographic locations. I remain cautiously optimistic going into 2006 as demand for our core financial guaranty product seems to be on the rise.”

### **Revenues Highlights**

*Credit enhancement production*<sup>(1)</sup> in the fourth quarter of 2005 was \$395.8 million, up 15% from the fourth quarter of 2004 which came in at \$344.2 million. Strong growth in U.S. public finance and U.S. structured finance were partially offset by a decline in international.

*Credit enhancement production* for the full year 2005 of \$1,249.4 million was 3% lower than credit enhancement production of \$1,287.8 million in 2004, driven by tighter credit spreads across many of the markets Ambac serves and a slow down in transactions in the international market, primarily Europe.

\* \* \*

*Net premiums earned and other credit enhancement fees* for the fourth quarter of 2005 were \$217.5 million, which represented a 14% increase from the \$190.4 million earned in the fourth quarter of 2004. Increases in net premiums earned in U.S. public finance and U.S. structured finance were partially offset by decreased net premiums earned in international.

Net premiums earned include accelerated premiums, which result from refundings, calls and other accelerations recognized during the quarter. Accelerated premiums were \$35.4 million in the fourth quarter of 2005 (which had a net income per diluted share effect of \$0.19), up 179% from \$12.7 million (\$0.07 per diluted share) in accelerated premiums in the fourth quarter of 2004. The majority of the accelerated premiums relate to the U.S. public finance segment. The current quarter was once again impacted by one large public finance refunded transaction, representing 41% of the total accelerated amount. Long-term interest rates remained relatively low during the year and we experienced extremely high refunding activity in our public finance segment. However, as interest rates rise, the level of accelerated premiums should decline.

\* \* \*

*Net investment income* for the fourth quarter of 2005 was \$109.0 million, representing an increase of 16% from \$94.0 million in the comparable period of 2004. Net investment income excluding net investment income from Variable Interest Entities (“VIEs”) for the fourth quarter of 2005 was \$96.7 million, representing an increase of 6% from \$90.9 million in the fourth quarter of 2004. This increase was due primarily to the growth in the investment portfolio driven by ongoing collection of financial guarantee premiums and fees, partially offset by a lower reinvestment rate and use of cash for repurchases of Ambac stock during the second and third quarters of 2005 totaling approximately \$300 million.

Net investment income from VIEs for the fourth quarter of 2005 was \$12.3 million, up from \$3.1 million in the fourth quarter of 2004. Investment income from VIEs results from the consolidation of certain trusts that Ambac has insured and consolidated under accounting pronouncement FIN 46. The increase in interest income from VIEs reflects the consolidation of two transactions executed in the fourth quarter of 2004. Investment income from VIEs is offset by interest expense on VIEs, shown separately in the Consolidated Statements of Operations.

*Net investment income* (including net investment income from VIEs) for the full year 2005 was \$426.1 million, representing an increase of 18% from \$361.1 million in the comparable period of 2004, primarily as a result of the reasons provided above.

### **Loss Reserve Activity**

Case basis loss reserves (loss reserves for exposures that have defaulted) increased \$20.2 million during the fourth quarter of 2005 from \$82.9 million at September 30, 2005 to \$103.1 million at December 31, 2005. The increase was primarily related to a new case reserve established during the quarter for a public finance infrastructure transaction and an addition to an existing case reserve for a stressed health care transaction.

Active credit reserves ("ACR") are established for probable and estimable losses due to credit deterioration on adversely classified insured transactions. Ambac continuously monitors its insured portfolio actively seeking to mitigate claims. The ACR decreased by \$7.2 million during the quarter, primarily as a result of net improvement in the classified portfolio and a transfer of ACR reserves to case related to the public finance infrastructure transaction discussed above. At December 31, 2005, the specific Hurricane Katrina-related provision amounts to \$91.5 million, down slightly from \$92.0 million at September 30 due to amortization and pay downs on effected credits. Approximately \$1.1 billion of Katrina-impacted credits are included in Ambac's adversely classified credit portfolio. Ambac did not pay any Katrina-related claims during the quarter and has fully recovered the amounts paid in the third quarter. Ambac's estimate of losses related to the hurricane does not consider any potential, federal, state or local government assistance to individual municipalities or institutions as such assistance still has not been determined. The credit loss estimation process involves the exercise of considerable judgment. Ambac will continue to assess the impact of Hurricane Katrina on subsequent periods as more information becomes available to us and the ultimate actual loss associated with the hurricane may be materially different than the current estimate and thereby may affect future operating results.

### **Other Items**



*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the fourth quarter of 2005 were \$20.0 million, or \$0.12 per diluted share; consisting of net realized losses on investment securities of (\$2.2) million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$22.0 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$0.2 million. For the fourth quarter of 2004, net securities gains/(losses) were \$16.5 million, or \$0.09 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$7.5 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$11.9 million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$2.9) million.

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the full year 2005 were \$73.1 million, or \$0.40 per diluted share, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$8.6 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$15.0 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$49.5 million. As discussed in the previous quarters, the mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts related almost entirely to interest rate hedge contracts related to long-term fixed rate liabilities in Ambac's investment agreement business that were highly effective from an economic perspective but did not meet the technical requirements of FAS 133. The hedges have been redesignated to meet the technical requirements and it is expected that the mark-to-market of the hedge and hedged item will substantially offset each other in the income statement prospectively. For the full year 2004 net securities gains were \$45.8 million, or \$0.27 per diluted share, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$35.1 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$27.1 million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$16.4) million.

### **Balance Sheet Highlights**

Total assets as of December 31, 2005 were \$19.77 billion, up 5% from total assets of \$18.75 billion at December 31, 2004. The increase was driven by cash generated from business written during the period and the proceeds of the \$400 debt issuance in December 2005 (discussed below), offset by stock repurchases during the period and the decrease in the unrealized gains in the investment portfolio driven by higher long-term interest rates. As of December 31, 2005, stockholders' equity was \$5.40 billion, a 7% increase from year-end 2004 stockholders' equity of \$5.02 billion. The increase was primarily the result of net income during the year, offset by stock repurchases and lower "Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income" driven by slightly higher long-term interest rates.

(Footnotes omitted.)

48. On April 26, 2006, Ambac announced its first quarter 2006 financial results in a release that stated in part:

Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced first quarter 2006 net income of \$221.1 million, or \$2.06 per diluted share. This represents a 19% increase from first quarter 2005 net income of \$185.5 million, and a 24% increase in net income per diluted share from \$1.66 in the first quarter of 2005.

### **Net Income Per Diluted Share**

Net income and net income per diluted share are computed in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, many research analysts and investors do not limit their analysis of our earnings to a strictly GAAP basis. In order to assist investors in their understanding of quarterly results, Ambac provides other information.

Earnings measures reported by research analysts exclude the net income impact of net gains and losses from sales of investment securities and mark-to-market gains and losses on credit, total return and non-trading derivative contracts (collectively “net security gains and losses”) and certain non-recurring and other items. Certain research analysts and investors further exclude the net income impact of accelerated premiums earned on guaranteed obligations that have been refunded and other accelerated earnings (“accelerated earnings”). During the first quarter 2006, net security gains and losses had the effect of increasing net income by \$8.1 million, \$0.08 on a per diluted share basis. Accelerated earnings had the effect of increasing net income by \$12.0 million, or \$0.11 per diluted share for the first quarter 2006. Table I, below, provides first quarter comparisons of earnings for 2006 and 2005.

\* \* \*

Commenting on the overall results, Ambac President and Chief Executive Officer, Robert J. Genader, noted, “This was another solid quarter for Ambac in a challenging business environment. The company’s scale, market diversification and capacity continue to be highly valued by our global clients. These important attributes enable us to participate across a broad spectrum of profitable transactions both domestic and international.” Mr. Genader further commented, “Although very large transactions were generally absent during the first quarter, several notable international deals have already closed in April.”

### **Revenues Highlights**

*Credit enhancement production* in the first quarter of 2006 was \$233.5 million, up 17% from the first quarter of 2005 which came in at \$199.0 million. Growth in international and U.S. structured finance were partially offset by a decline in U.S. public finance.



*Net premiums earned and other credit enhancement fees* for the first quarter of 2006 were \$208.4 million, which represented a 2% decrease from the \$211.7 million earned in the first quarter of 2005. Increases in net premiums earned in U.S. public finance and U.S. structured finance were partially offset by decreased net premiums earned in international.

Net premiums earned include accelerated premiums, which result from refundings, calls and other accelerations recognized during the quarter. Accelerated premiums were \$25.0 million in the first quarter of 2006 (which had a net income per diluted share effect of \$0.11), down 28% from \$34.5 million (\$0.17 per diluted share) in accelerated premiums in the first quarter of 2005. The majority of the accelerated premiums relate to the U.S. public finance segment. As long-term interest rates rise, the level of accelerated premiums from refundings should decline from prior years' levels. Accelerated premiums in the first quarter of 2006 and 2005 include \$7.7 million and \$4.5 million, respectively, related to the impact of reinsurance cancellations, as discussed below under "Reinsurance Cancellations."

\* \* \*

*Net investment income* for the first quarter of 2006 was \$114.0 million, representing an increase of 12% from \$102.0 million in the comparable period of 2005. Net investment income excluding net investment income from Variable Interest Entities ("VIEs") for the first quarter of 2006 was \$101.8 million, representing an increase of 12% from \$90.7 million in the first quarter of 2005. This increase was due primarily to the growth in the investment portfolio driven by ongoing collection of financial guarantee premiums and fees and a \$200 million capital contribution from the parent company in the fourth quarter of 2005. Net investment income was also modestly affected by increases in interest rates. Net investment income from VIEs for the first quarter of 2006 was \$12.2 million, up from \$11.3 million in the first quarter of 2005. Investment income from VIEs results from the consolidation of certain trusts that Ambac has insured and consolidated under accounting pronouncement FIN 46. Investment income from VIEs is offset by interest expense on VIEs, shown separately in the Consolidated Statements of Operations.

*Other income* for the first quarter of 2006 was \$29.5 million, significantly higher than \$2.4 million reported in the comparable period of 2005. During the first quarter of 2006, Ambac sold the remaining three aircraft from a previously reported defaulted enhanced equipment trust certificate transaction. The gain on the sale of the aircraft amounted to \$25.0 million and is included in "other income" rather than as a loss recovery because the aircraft had been classified as operating assets for the short period of time in which the company took possession of them after the default.

*Financial services.* The financial services segment is comprised of the investment agreement business and derivative products business. The investment agreement business is managed with the goal of approximately matching the cash

flows of the investment agreement liabilities with the cash flows of the related investment portfolio. The primary activities in the derivative products business are intermediation of interest rate and currency swap transactions and taking total return swap positions on certain fixed income obligations. Gross interest income less gross interest expense from investment and payment agreements plus results from the derivative products business, excluding net realized investment gains and losses and unrealized gains and losses on total return swaps and non-trading derivative contracts, was \$11.7 million in the first quarter of 2006, down 22% from \$15.0 million in the first quarter of 2005. The decrease was driven by lower inception revenues on new business in the derivative products business, partially offset by spread improvement in the investment agreement business.

### **Reinsurance Cancellations**

During the first quarter 2006 Ambac cancelled its remaining reinsurance contracts with two reinsurers – AXA Re Finance S.A. and American Re-Insurance Company and recaptured \$3.9 billion of par outstanding. Both reinsurers had exited the financial guarantee reinsurance business in 2003. Included in ceded premiums in our Consolidated Statement of Operations is \$37.0 million in returned premiums from the cancellations, of which approximately \$29.3 million was deferred. The difference, \$7.7 million, included in accelerated premiums, results from the difference between the negotiated amount of returned premiums and the associated unearned premium remaining on the previously ceded portion of the underlying guarantees. The net income impact of these cancellations, presented in Table I, above, as part of accelerated premiums, amounted to approximately \$2.0 million, or \$0.02 per diluted share.

During the first quarter 2005 Ambac cancelled a reinsurance contract with Radian Reinsurance Inc and recaptured approximately \$7.5 billion of par outstanding. Included in ceded premiums in our Consolidated Statement of Operations is \$55.8 million in returned premiums from the cancellation, of which approximately \$51.3 million was deferred. The difference, \$4.5 million, is included in accelerated premiums. The net income impact of this cancellation, presented in Table I, above, as part of accelerated premiums, amounted to approximately \$1.8 million, or \$0.02 per diluted share.

\* \* \*

### **Loss Reserve Activity**

Case basis loss reserves (loss reserves for exposures that have defaulted) increased \$18.2 million during the first quarter of 2006 from \$103.1 million at December 31, 2005 to \$121.3 million at March 31, 2006. The increase was primarily related to additional case reserves for a public finance infrastructure transaction and an MBS transaction, partially offset by \$7.8 million in payments during the quarter.

Active credit reserves (“ACR”) are established for probable and estimable losses due to credit deterioration on adversely classified insured transactions. Ambac continuously monitors its insured portfolio actively seeking to mitigate claims. The ACR decreased by \$25.9 million during the quarter, primarily as a result of net improvements in the classified portfolio and a transfer of ACR reserves to case reserves for the MBS transaction noted above. At March 31, 2006, the specific Hurricane Katrina-related provision amounts to \$91.1 million, down slightly from \$91.5 million at December 31, 2005. Approximately \$1.1 billion of Katrina-impacted credits remain in Ambac’s adversely classified credit portfolio. Ambac did not pay any Katrina-related claims during the quarter.

### **Other Items**

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the first quarter of 2006 were \$13.5 million, or \$0.08 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$5.1 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$7.2 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$1.2 million. For the first quarter of 2005, net securities gains/(losses) were \$9.1 million, or \$0.05 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$1.9 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$6.0 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$1.2 million.

### **Balance Sheet Highlights**

Total assets as of March 31, 2006 were \$19.74 billion, up 1% from total assets of \$19.73 billion at December 31, 2005. The increase was driven by cash generated from operations during the period, partially offset by the decrease in unrealized gains in the investment portfolio driven by higher long-term interest rates and stock repurchases during the period amounting to approximately \$30.0 million. As of March 31, 2006, stockholders’ equity was \$5.47 billion, a 2% increase from year-end 2005 stockholders’ equity of \$5.37 billion. The increase was primarily the result of net income during the period, offset by stock repurchases and lower “Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income” driven by higher long-term interest rates.

(Footnote omitted)

49. On July 26, 2006, Ambac reported its second quarter 2006 financial results in a release that stated in part:

Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced second quarter 2006 net income of \$238.6 million, or \$2.22 per diluted share. This represents a 28% increase from second quarter 2005 net income of \$186.1



million, and a 31% increase in net income per diluted share from \$1.69 in the second quarter of 2005.

### **Net Income Per Diluted Share**

Net income and net income per diluted share are computed in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, many research analysts and investors do not limit their analysis of our earnings to a strictly GAAP basis. In order to assist investors in their understanding of quarterly results, Ambac provides other information.

Earnings measures reported by research analysts exclude the net income impact of net gains and losses from sales of investment securities and mark-to-market gains and losses on credit, total return and non-trading derivative contracts (collectively “net security gains and losses”) and certain other items. Certain research analysts and investors further exclude the net income impact of accelerated premiums earned on guaranteed obligations that have been refunded and other accelerated earnings (“accelerated earnings”). During the second quarter 2006, net security gains and losses had the effect of increasing net income by \$32.9 million, \$0.31 on a per diluted share basis. Accelerated earnings had the effect of increasing net income by \$22.8 million, or \$0.21 per diluted share for the second quarter 2006. Table I, below, provides second quarter and six-month comparisons of earnings for 2006 and 2005.

\* \* \*

Commenting on the overall results, Ambac Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Robert J. Genader, noted, “I am encouraged by the strong credit enhancement production and solid financial results for the quarter. The company’s ability to produce record results in this suboptimal business environment is a testament to our people and our strategy. We continue to uncover attractive opportunities to put our capital to work in the short-term and I am confident that the company is well positioned both domestically and internationally for the long-term.”

### **Revenues Highlights**

*Credit enhancement production* in the second quarter of 2006 was \$531.0 million, up 33% from the second quarter of 2005 which came in at \$397.9 million. Growth in international and U.S. structured finance was partially offset by a decline in U.S. public finance.

*Credit enhancement production* for the six months of 2006 of \$764.4 million was 28% higher than credit enhancement production of \$596.9 million in the same period of 2005.

\* \* \*

Structured finance earned premiums and other credit enhancement fees grew 9%. The rate of growth in structured finance has improved as the recent level of writings in asset classes such as commercial asset-backed securities, auto securitizations and pooled debt obligations has increased. Narrow credit spreads and high prepayment speeds in the mortgage-backed and home equity book of business and early terminations of transactions in other structured finance sectors continue to partially offset the positive effects of new business writings.

International earned premiums and other credit enhancement fees decreased by 6%. The decline was driven primarily by significant paydowns and calls over the past several quarters, a slow-down in new business generated in the past several quarters prior to this quarter, and the recent business mix which has trended towards long-dated infrastructure transactions that earn premiums over a longer period of time than typical structured finance exposures.

Net investment income for the second quarter of 2006 was \$117.0 million, representing an increase of 12% from \$104.5 million in the comparable period of 2005. Net investment income excluding net investment income from Variable Interest Entities (“VIEs”) for the second quarter of 2006 was \$104.5 million, representing an increase of 13% from \$92.2 million in the second quarter of 2005. This increase was due primarily to growth in the investment portfolio driven by the ongoing collection of financial guarantee premiums and fees and a \$200 million capital contribution from the parent company in the fourth quarter of 2005. Net investment income was also modestly affected by recent increases in interest rates. Investment income from VIEs is offset by interest expense on VIEs, shown separately in the Consolidated Statements of Operations.

\* \* \*

*Financial services revenues* were \$22.5 million in the first half of 2006, up 24% from the \$18.2 million of revenues in the first half of 2005 primarily due to the reason provided above.

\* \* \*

### **Loss Reserve Activity**

Case basis loss reserves (loss reserves for exposures that have defaulted) increased \$17.4 million during the second quarter of 2006 from \$121.3 million at March 31, 2006 to \$138.7 million at June 30, 2006. The increase was primarily related to additional case reserves for a healthcare transaction and an addition to loss adjustment expense reserves. Paid claims during the quarter amounting to \$20.1 million included a payment on a CDO which had previously been classified within the active credit reserves, paid and terminated during the current quarter.

Active credit reserves (“ACR”) are established for probable and estimable losses due to credit deterioration on adversely classified insured transactions.



Ambac continuously monitors its insured portfolio actively seeking to mitigate claims. The ACR decreased by \$24.7 million during the quarter, from \$171.7 million at March 31, 2006 to \$147.0 million at June 30, 2006. The decrease was primarily the result of net improvements in the classified portfolio and a transfer of ACR reserves to case reserves for the CDO transaction noted above. At June 30, 2006, the specific Hurricane Katrina-related provision amounts to \$90.4 million, down slightly from \$91.1 million at March 31, 2006. Approximately \$1.1 billion of Katrina-impacted credits remain in Ambac's adversely classified credit portfolio. Ambac did not pay any Katrina-related claims during the quarter.

### **Other Items**

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the second quarter of 2006 were \$51.0 million, or \$0.31 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$44.4 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$7.2 million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$0.6) million. Approximately \$38 million of the net realized gains on investment securities relate to cash recoveries received during the quarter related to a security in the investment agreement portfolio that had been written down in 2002 and 2003. For the second quarter of 2005, net securities gains/(losses) were \$29.6 million, or \$0.14 per diluted share; consisting of net realized losses on investment securities of (\$0.6) million, net mark-to-market losses on credit and total return derivatives of (\$17.0) million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$47.2 million. The mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts relate almost entirely to interest rate hedge contracts related to long-term fixed rate liabilities in Ambac's investment agreement business that were redesignated during that quarter. Those hedges were redesignated to meet the technical requirements of FAS 133 as of July 1, 2005.

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the first half of 2006 were \$64.4 million, or \$0.38 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$49.5 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$14.4 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$0.5 million. For the first half of 2005 net securities gains were \$38.8 million, or \$0.19 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$1.3 million, mark-to-market losses on credit derivatives and total return swaps of (\$10.9) million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$48.4 million.

### **Balance Sheet Highlights**

Total assets as of June 30, 2006 were \$20.27 billion, up 3% from total assets of \$19.73 billion at December 31, 2005. The increase was driven by cash generated from operations during the period, partially offset by a decrease in

unrealized gains in the investment portfolio driven by higher long-term interest rates.

As of June 30, 2006, stockholders' equity was \$5.63 billion, a 5% increase from year-end 2005 stockholders' equity of \$5.37 billion. The increase was primarily the result of net income during the period, offset by lower "Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income" driven by higher long-term interest rates.

(Footnote omitted.)

50. On October 25, 2006, the Company issued a press release entitled "Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Announces Third Quarter Net Income of \$213.5 Million up to 22%." The press release stated in part:

Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced third quarter 2006 net income of \$213.5 million, or \$1.98 per diluted share. This represents a 22% increase from third quarter 2005 net income of \$175.1 million, and a 23% increase in net income per diluted share from \$1.61 in the third quarter of 2005.

#### **Net Income Per Diluted Share**

Net income and net income per diluted share are computed in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, many research analysts and investors do not limit their analysis of our earnings to a strictly GAAP basis. In order to assist investors in their understanding of quarterly results, Ambac provides other information.

Earnings measures reported by research analysts exclude the net income impact of net gains and losses from sales of investment securities and mark-to-market gains and losses on credit, total return and non-trading derivative contracts (collectively "net security gains and losses") and certain other items. Certain research analysts and investors further exclude the net income impact of accelerated premiums earned on guaranteed obligations that have been refunded and other accelerated earnings ("accelerated earnings"). During the third quarter 2006, net security gains and losses had the effect of increasing net income by \$6.5 million, \$0.06 on a per diluted share basis. Accelerated earnings had the effect of increasing net income by \$14.5 million, or \$0.13 per diluted share for the third quarter 2006. Table I, below, provides third quarter and nine-month comparisons of earnings for 2006 and 2005.

\*

\*

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**Revenues Highlights**

*Credit enhancement production*<sup>(1)</sup> in the third quarter of 2006 was \$216.2 million, down 16% from the third quarter of 2005 which came in at \$256.6 million. Growth in international was more than offset by declines in U.S. public finance and U.S. structured finance.

*Credit enhancement production*<sup>(1)</sup> for the nine months of 2006 of \$980.7 million was 15% higher than credit enhancement production of \$853.5 million in the same period of 2005, driven by growth in the international and U.S. structured finance markets during the nine-month period.

\* \* \*

Structured finance earned premiums and other credit enhancement fees grew 12%. The rate of growth in structured finance has improved as the recent level of writings in asset classes such as commercial asset-backed securities, auto securitizations and pooled debt obligations has increased. Narrow credit spreads and high prepayment speeds in the mortgage-backed and home equity book of business and early terminations of transactions in other structured finance sectors continue to partially offset the positive effects of new business writings.

International earned premiums and other credit enhancement fees decreased by 6%. The decline was driven primarily by significant paydowns and calls over the past several quarters and the recent business mix which has trended towards long-dated infrastructure transactions that earn premiums over a longer period of time than typical structured finance exposures.

*Net investment income* (including net investment income from VIEs) for the third quarter of 2006 was \$120.2 million, representing an increase of 9% from \$110.6 million in the comparable period of 2005. This increase was due primarily to growth in the investment portfolio driven by the ongoing collection of financial guarantee premiums and fees and a \$200 million capital contribution from the parent company in the fourth quarter of 2005, partially offset by a \$5.3 million net positive adjustment booked in the third quarter 2005 for municipal bonds within the portfolio that had been pre-refunded. Investment income from VIEs is offset by interest expense on VIEs, shown separately in the Consolidated Statements of Operations.

\* \* \*

**Loss Reserve Activity**

Case basis loss reserves (loss reserves for exposures that have defaulted) decreased \$12.0 million during the third quarter of 2006 from \$138.7 million at June 30, 2006 to \$126.7 million at September 30, 2006. The decrease was driven primarily by claim payments made during the quarter amounting to \$8.9 million.



Active credit reserves (“ACR”) are established for probable and estimable losses due to credit deterioration on adversely classified insured transactions. Ambac continuously monitors its insured portfolio actively seeking to mitigate claims. The ACR increased by \$0.6 million during the quarter, from \$147.0 million at June 30, 2006 to \$147.6 million at September 30, 2006. The increase was driven by increased reserves on certain credits within the U.S. public finance and structured finance portfolios, offset by a \$35.6 million reduction in the ACR for Hurricane Katrina impacted credits. At September 30, 2006, the specific Hurricane Katrina-related provision amounts to \$50.5 million, down from \$90.4 million at June 30, 2006. The decrease is primarily due to significant state and federal support recently provided to the region, particularly the greater New Orleans area. Ambac did not pay any Katrina-related claims during the quarter.

*Provision for income taxes* for the third quarter of 2006 amounted to \$83.6 million, an effective tax rate of 28.1%. This compares to the third quarter of 2005 tax provision of \$51.9 million, an effective tax rate of 22.8%. The increased tax rate in 2006 was due to the net release of tax reserves in the third quarter 2005 and higher taxable income resulting from improved financial guarantee underwriting results in the third quarter 2006 relative to the comparable prior period primarily as a result of Hurricane Katrina related loss activity.

*Provision for income taxes* for the nine months of 2006 amounted to \$252.5 million, an effective tax rate of 27.3%. This compares to the nine months of 2005 tax provision of \$193.1 million, an effective tax rate of 26.1%. The increased tax rate in 2006 is explained above.

### **Other Items**

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the third quarter of 2006 were \$9.9 million, or \$0.06 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$7.9 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$2.1 million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$0.1) million. For the third quarter of 2005, net securities gains/(losses) were \$14.5 million, or \$0.08 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$9.5 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$3.9 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$1.1 million.

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the nine months of 2006 were \$74.4 million, or \$0.44 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$57.5 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$16.5 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$0.4 million. Approximately \$51 million of the net realized gains on investment securities relate to cash recoveries received during the year related to a security in the investment agreement portfolio that had been written down in 2002 and 2003. For the nine months of 2005, net securities gains were

\$53.1 million, or \$0.27 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$10.8 million, mark-to-market losses on credit derivatives and total return swaps of (\$7.0) million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$49.3 million. The mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts relate almost entirely to interest rate hedge contracts in Ambac's investment agreement business that were redesignated to meet the technical requirements of FAS 133 as of July 1, 2005.

### **Balance Sheet Highlights**

Total assets as of September 30, 2006 were \$21.09 billion, up 7% from total assets of \$19.73 billion at December 31, 2005. The increase was driven by cash generated from operations during the period.

As of September 30, 2006, stockholders' equity was \$6.01 billion, a 12% increase from year-end 2005 stockholders' equity of \$5.37 billion. The increase was primarily the result of net income during the period.

(Footnotes omitted.)

51. On January 31, 2007, the Company announced its fourth quarter 2006 financial results in a release stating in part:

Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced fourth quarter 2006 net income of \$202.7 million, or \$1.88 per diluted share. This represents a 1% decrease from fourth quarter 2005 net income of \$204.3 million, or \$1.90 per diluted share.

### **Net Income Per Diluted Share**

Net income and net income per diluted share are computed in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, many research analysts and investors do not limit their analysis of our earnings to a strictly GAAP basis. In order to assist investors in their understanding of quarterly results, Ambac provides other information.

Earnings measures reported by research analysts exclude the net income impact of net gains and losses from sales of investment securities and mark-to-market gains and losses on credit, total return and non-trading derivative contracts (collectively "net security gains and losses") and certain other items. Certain research analysts and investors further exclude the net income impact of accelerated premiums earned on guaranteed obligations that have been refunded and other accelerated earnings ("accelerated earnings"). During the fourth quarter 2006, net security gains and losses had the effect of increasing net income by \$3.6 million, or \$0.04 on a per diluted share basis. Other items during the fourth



quarter 2006 had a net income effect of (\$3.9) million, (\$0.04) on a per diluted share basis, and represents the write-off of previously deferred issuance expenses related to debentures that were redeemed in October 2006. Accelerated earnings had the effect of increasing net income by \$18.1 million, or \$0.17 per diluted share for the fourth quarter 2006. Table I, below, provides fourth quarter and full year comparisons of earnings for 2006 and 2005.

\* \* \*

Commenting on the overall results, Ambac Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Robert J. Genader, noted, “I am satisfied with our overall business results for the quarter and for the full year. Despite one of the most difficult business environments the industry has faced in many years, Ambac’s full-year top line production is very acceptable. Most gratifyingly, our record-level full-year international production demonstrates our success in expanding our global reach, as our triple-A financial strength and reputation for innovative and efficient execution is now firmly planted across a broad segment of the international markets.”

### **Revenues Highlights**

*Credit enhancement production* in the fourth quarter of 2006 was \$314.5 million, down 21% from the fourth quarter of 2005 which came in at \$395.8 million. Growth in international was more than offset by declines in U.S. public finance and U.S. structured finance.

*Credit enhancement production<sup>(1)</sup>* for the full year of 2006 of \$1,295.2 million was 4% higher than credit enhancement production of \$1,249.4 million in 2005, as significant growth in international business more than offset the decline in the U.S. public finance business.

\* \* \*

### **Loss Reserve Activity**

Case basis loss reserves (loss reserves for exposures that have defaulted) decreased \$84.2 million during the fourth quarter of 2006 from \$126.7 million at September 30, 2006 to \$42.5 million at December 31, 2006. The decrease was driven by the settlement of several impaired transactions during the quarter including a health care transaction that had been fully-reserved. Total claim payments during the quarter amounted to \$68.8 million.

Active credit reserves (“ACR”) are established for probable and estimable losses due to credit deterioration on certain adversely classified insured transactions. Ambac continuously monitors its insured portfolio actively seeking to mitigate claims. The ACR increased by \$25.0 million during the quarter, from \$147.6 million at September 30, 2006 to \$172.6 million at December 31, 2006. The increase was driven primarily by net increases in reserves on certain credits

within the U.S. public finance portfolio, most notably within the transportation sector. At December 31, 2006, the specific Hurricane Katrina-related provision amounts to \$50.1 million, down slightly from \$50.5 million at September 30, 2006. Ambac did not pay any Katrina-related claims during the year.

### **Other Items**

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the fourth quarter of 2006 were \$5.8 million, or \$0.04 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$9.6 million, net mark-to-market losses on credit and total return derivatives of (\$4.8) million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$1.0 million. For the fourth quarter of 2005, net securities gains/(losses) were \$20.0 million, or \$0.12 per diluted share; consisting of net realized losses on investment securities of (\$2.2) million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$22.0 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$0.2 million.

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the full year of 2006 were \$80.2 million, or \$0.48 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$67.1 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$11.6 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$1.5 million. Approximately \$56 million of the net realized gains on investment securities in 2006 relate to cash recoveries received during the year related to a security in the investment agreement portfolio that had been written down in 2002 and 2003. For the full year of 2005, net securities gains were \$73.1 million, or \$0.40 per diluted share; consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$8.6 million, mark-to-market losses on credit derivatives and total return swaps of \$15.0 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$49.5 million. The mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts relate almost entirely to interest rate hedge contracts in Ambac's investment agreement business that were redesignated to meet the technical requirements of FAS 133 as of July 1, 2005.

### **Balance Sheet Highlights**

Total assets as of December 31, 2006 were \$20.27 billion, up 9% from total assets of \$18.55 billion at December 31, 2005. The increase was driven primarily by cash generated from operations during the period.

As of December 31, 2006, stockholders' equity was \$6.18 billion, a 15% increase from year-end 2005 stockholders' equity of \$5.38 billion. The increase was primarily the result of net income during the period.

52. On February 7, 2007, Ambac issued a press release entitled "Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Announced Proposed Offering of Directly-Issued Subordinated Capital Securities." The release stated in part:

Ambac Financial Group, Inc. today announced its plan to conduct a public offering of approximately \$400 million Directly-Issued Subordinated Capital Securities (DISCS(SM)). The DISCS are expected to be rated Aa3 by Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and A+ by Standard & Poor's Ratings Services.

The Company currently intends to use the proceeds to repurchase shares of its common stock pursuant to an accelerated share repurchase program, subject to market and other business conditions. Any proceeds not used for such share repurchases are intended to be used for general corporate purposes.

Citigroup Corporate and Investment Banking, Goldman Sachs & Co. and JPMorgan will act as joint book-running managers for the DISCS underwriting syndicate.

The proposed offering would be conducted via an existing effective shelf registration statement. This press release shall not constitute an offer to sell, or the solicitation of an offer to buy, any securities, nor shall there be any sale of securities mentioned in this press release in any state in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such state. The offering of DISCS will be made only by means of a prospectus and a related prospectus supplement.

53. On February 12, 2007, Ambac issued a release, entitled "Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Closes \$400 Million Directly-Issued Subordinated Capital Securities; Company to Repurchase \$400 Million in Common Stock," that stated in part:

Ambac Financial Group, Inc. today announced the closing of 6.15% \$400 million Directly-Issued Subordinated Capital securities (DISCS(SM)). The DISCS were sold at a discount to par to yield 6.199%.

Ambac will use all of the net proceeds from the offering and additional funds to purchase \$400 million worth of shares of its common stock. The common stock will be purchased through an accelerated share repurchase agreement. The specific number of shares to be repurchased is generally based on the volume-weighted average share price of the Company's common shares during the term of the accelerated repurchase agreement. Based on current share price, the \$400 million share buyback represents approximately 4.3% of the Company's market capitalization.

Sean Leonard, Chief Financial Officer, stated "Issuance of the subordinated capital securities in combination with the share repurchase program achieves the objective of further optimizing Ambac's capital structure by

lowering the overall cost of capital. Importantly, we will improve return on equity and earnings per share measures without reducing our claims-paying resources.”

54. On April 25, 2007, the Company released its first quarter 2007 financial results, stating in part:

**Ambac Financial Group, Inc.** (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced first quarter 2007 net income of \$213.3 million, or \$2.02 per diluted share. This represents a 4% decrease from first quarter 2006 net income of \$221.1 million, and a 2% decrease in net income per diluted share from \$2.06 a year earlier.

#### **Net Income Per Diluted Share**

Net income and net income per diluted share are computed in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, many research analysts and investors do not limit their analysis of our earnings to a strictly GAAP basis. In order to assist investors in their understanding of quarterly results, Ambac provides other information.

Earnings measures reported by research analysts exclude the net income impact of net gains and losses from sales of investment securities and mark-to-market gains and losses on credit, total return and non-trading derivative contracts (collectively “net security gains and losses”) and certain other items. Certain research analysts and investors further exclude the net income impact of accelerated premiums earned on guaranteed obligations that have been refunded and other accelerated earnings (“accelerated earnings”). During the first quarter 2007, net security gains and losses had the effect of increasing net income by \$2.5 million, or \$0.02 on a per diluted share basis. Accelerated earnings had the effect of increasing net income by \$24.7 million, or \$0.24 per diluted share during the quarter.

\* \* \*

Commenting on the overall results, Ambac Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Robert J. Genader, noted, “The first quarter evidenced improved business production across all major business sectors relative to the 2006 comparable quarter. Debt issuance and capital markets activity continues to be strong. Importantly, recent evidence of credit spread widening in the mortgage related asset classes should lead to increased demand for our core financial guarantee product, provided of course, that wider spreads continue to prevail.”

#### **Revenues Highlights**



*Credit enhancement production*<sup>(1)</sup> in the first quarter of 2007 was \$310.1 million, up 33% from \$233.5 million reported in the first quarter of 2006. Growth was achieved in all three sectors, led by the 49% increase in U.S. structured finance.

\* \* \*

### **Reinsurance Cancellations**

During the first quarter 2006, Ambac cancelled its remaining reinsurance contracts with two reinsurers and recaptured \$3.9 billion of par outstanding. Included in ceded premiums in our Consolidated Statement of Operations is \$37.0 million in returned premiums from the cancellations, of which approximately \$29.3 million was deferred. The difference, \$7.7 million, included in accelerated premiums, resulted from the difference between the contractual amount of returned premiums and the associated unearned premium remaining on the previously ceded portion of the underlying guarantees. The net income impact of the cancellations, presented in Table I, above, as part of accelerated premiums, amounted to approximately \$2.0 million, or \$0.02 per diluted share.

\* \* \*

### **Loss Reserve Activity**

Case basis loss reserves (loss reserves for exposures that have defaulted) decreased \$4.8 million during the first quarter of 2007 from \$42.5 million at December 31, 2006 to \$37.7 million at March 31, 2007. The decrease was driven by improving conditions on certain credits for which we had previously paid claims. Total net claim payments during the quarter amounted to (\$0.1) million.

Active credit reserves ("ACR") are established for probable and estimable losses due to credit deterioration on certain adversely classified insured transactions. The ACR increased by \$16.2 million during the quarter, from \$172.6 million at December 31, 2006 to \$188.8 million at March 31, 2007. The increase was driven primarily by net increases in reserves on certain credits within the U.S. public finance portfolio.

### **Other Items**

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the first quarter of 2007 were \$3.7 million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$6.6 million, net mark-to-market losses on credit and total return derivatives of (\$1.9) million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$1.0) million. Approximately \$6.2 million of the net realized gains on investment securities relate to cash recoveries received during the quarter related to a security in the investment agreement portfolio that had recognized impairment losses in prior years. For the first quarter of 2006, net securities gains/(losses) were \$13.4 million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$5.1 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$7.2 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$1.1 million.



**Balance Sheet Highlights**

Total assets as of March 31, 2007 were \$20.11 billion, down 1% from total assets of \$20.27 billion at December 31, 2006. The decrease was primarily driven by a net draw down from our investment agreement portfolio, partially offset by cash generated from operations during the period.

On February 12, 2007, Ambac issued \$400 million of Directly-Issued Subordinated Capital Securities (DISCS<sup>SM</sup>). Ambac used the net proceeds from the offering and additional funds to purchase \$400 million worth of shares of its common stock. The common stock was purchased through an accelerated share buyback agreement and resulted in 4.26 million shares acquired during the quarter. The total number of additional shares that will ultimately be repurchased under the program will be based on the volume-weighted average share price of the Company's common shares during the term of the accelerated buyback agreement.

As of March 31, 2007, stockholders' equity was \$5.99 billion, a 3% decrease from year-end 2006 stockholders' equity of \$6.18 billion. The decrease was primarily the result of the \$400 million share buyback, partially offset by net income during the period.

55. On July 25, 2007, Ambac reported its second quarter 2007 financial results, in a release stating in part:

**Ambac Financial Group, Inc.** (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced second quarter 2007 net income of \$173.0 million, or \$1.67 per diluted share. This represents a 27% decrease from second quarter 2006 net income of \$238.6 million, and a 25% decrease in net income per diluted share from \$2.22. The decrease is primarily due to unrealized mark-to-market losses amounting to (\$56.9) million, or (\$0.36) per diluted share, related to credit derivative exposures in the second quarter 2007. The comparable quarter of 2006 included net realized gains on investment securities of \$44.4 million, or \$0.27 per diluted share, primarily resulting from cash recoveries received related to a security in the investment agreement portfolio that had been written down in prior years. The second quarter 2007 unrealized mark-to-market losses on credit derivative exposures is the result of unfavorable market pricing of collateralized debt obligations with significant amounts of sub-prime residential mortgage collateral. As further described below, net mark-to-market gains and losses on credit derivatives and net gains and losses from sales of investment securities are excluded from the earnings measures used by research analysts.

**Net Income Per Diluted Share**

Net income and net income per diluted share are computed in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, many

research analysts and investors do not limit their analysis of our earnings to a strictly GAAP basis. In order to assist investors in their understanding of quarterly results, Ambac provides other information.

Earnings measures reported by research analysts exclude the net income impact of net gains and losses from sales of investment securities and mark-to-market gains and losses on credit, total return and non-trading derivative contracts (collectively “net security gains and losses”) and certain other items. Certain research analysts and investors further exclude the net income impact of accelerated premiums earned on guaranteed obligations that have been refunded and other accelerated earnings (“accelerated earnings”). During the second quarter 2007, net security gains and losses had the effect of decreasing net income by (\$34.6) million, or (\$0.34) on a per diluted share basis. Accelerated earnings had the effect of increasing net income by \$25.6 million, or \$0.25 per diluted share during the quarter.

\* \* \*

Commenting on the overall results, Ambac Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Robert J. Genader, noted, “We are pleased with the breadth and quality of our business production in the quarter. Our rigorous and proven approach enabled us to deliver positive results despite the turmoil in the sub-prime mortgage market that resulted in a negative mark-to-market adjustment. Our triple-A business model offers us key advantages, including our ability to hold insured transactions to maturity; no collateral or margin requirements on transactions insured; and, in the unlikely event of default we pay scheduled principal and interest, thereby minimizing liquidity risk.” Mr. Genader added, “Looking ahead, the disciplined execution of our strategy positions us well to benefit from the improving business conditions we see, with wider spreads, enhanced credit terms and increased demand for our valuable financial guarantee products.”

### **Revenues Highlights**

*Credit enhancement production*<sup>(1)</sup> in the second quarter of 2007 was \$367.8 million, down 31% from Ambac’s record quarterly production of \$531.0 million reported in the second quarter of 2006.

\* \* \*

Public finance earned premiums, before accelerations, grew 2% this quarter. Earned premium growth in this sector has been negatively impacted by the high level of refunding activity in Ambac’s public finance book in recent years, competitive pricing and the mix of business underwritten in recent periods.

Structured finance earned premiums and other credit enhancement fees grew 10%. The rate of growth in structured finance has improved recently, driven by strong premium production in asset classes such as pooled debt obligations and commercial asset-backed securities over the past several quarters.

International earned premiums and other credit enhancement fees decreased 2%. The decrease has resulted from deal terminations and a slow down in deal closings in 2007 relative to the prior year.

*Net investment income* for the second quarter of 2007 was \$113.2 million, representing an increase of 8% from \$104.5 million in the comparable period of 2006. This increase was due primarily to growth in the investment portfolio driven by the ongoing collection of financial guarantee premiums and fees.

*Net investment income* for the six months of 2007 was \$225.3 million, representing an increase of 9% from \$206.2 million in the comparable period of 2006, primarily as a result of the reasons provided above.

*Financial services revenues.* The financial services segment is comprised of the investment agreement business and the derivative products business. Gross interest income less gross interest expense from investment and payment agreements plus results from the derivative products business, excluding net realized investment gains and losses and unrealized gains and losses on total return swaps and non-trading derivative contracts, was \$9.2 million in the second quarter of 2007, down 15% from \$10.8 million in the second quarter of 2006. The decrease was primarily due to lower revenue from the interest rate swap, total return swap and investment agreement businesses in the second quarter 2007.

*Financial services revenues* were \$19.9 million in the first half of 2007, down 12% from the \$22.5 million of revenues in the first half of 2006 primarily due to the reason provided above.

### **Expenses Highlights**

*Financial guarantee expenses* of \$50.5 million for the second quarter of 2007 increased 13% from \$44.7 million of expenses for the second quarter of 2006. Financial guarantee loss and loss expenses were \$17.1 million in the second quarter of 2007, up from \$12.8 million in the second quarter of 2006. See "Loss Reserve Activity," below, for additional information on losses. Net underwriting and operating expenses of the financial guarantee sector totaled \$33.4 million in the second quarter of 2007, up 5% from \$31.9 million in the second quarter of 2006 primarily due to increased compensation expense.

*Financial guarantee expenses* of \$98.3 million for the first six months of 2007 increased 19% from \$82.7 million of expenses for the same period of 2006. The increase results primarily from higher loss expenses during the period.

### **Loss Reserve Activity**

Case basis loss reserves (loss reserves for exposures that have defaulted) increased \$9.6 million during the second quarter of 2007 from \$37.7 million at March 31, 2007 to \$47.3 million at June 30, 2007. Included in the March 31, 2007 case reserves balance were offsetting receivables for claims previously paid on a European transportation transaction that were deemed by management to be recoverable upon the anticipated successful restructuring of that transaction. The restructuring was finalized during the quarter and the payments due to Ambac



were received. Total net claim payments/(receipts) during the quarter amounted to (\$7.5) million.

Active credit reserves (“ACR”) are established for probable and estimable losses due to credit deterioration on certain adversely classified insured transactions. The ACR increased by \$14.9 million during the quarter, from \$188.8 million at March 31, 2007 to \$203.7 million at June 30, 2007. The increase was driven primarily by increases in reserves on certain credits primarily within the transportation sector of the U.S. public finance portfolio and to a lesser extent within the non-subprime RMBS sector of the structured finance portfolio, partially offset by favorable credit activity throughout both portfolios.

### **Other Items**

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the second quarter of 2007 were (\$52.7) million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$1.2 million, net mark-to-market losses on credit and total return derivatives of (\$57.9) million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$4.0 million. During the quarter a net mark-to-market loss amounting to (\$56.9) million was recorded related to insured collateralized debt obligations of asset-backed securitizations containing sub-prime mortgage-backed securities as collateral. The negative mark-to-market is driven by current market concerns over the most recent vintages of subprime RMBS and the recent lack of liquidity in the CDO of ABS market resulting in a reduction in market-quoted prices. Ambac’s exposure on those transactions all attach at levels senior to the triple-A attachment points as established by the rating agencies.

For the second quarter of 2006, net securities gains/(losses) were \$51.0 million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$44.4 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$7.2 million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$0.6) million. Approximately \$38 million of the second quarter 2006 net realized gains on investment securities related to cash recoveries received from a security in the investment agreement portfolio that had been written down in previous years.

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the first half of 2007 were (\$49.0) million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$7.8 million, net mark-to-market losses on credit and total return derivatives of (\$59.8) million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$3.0 million. For the first half of 2006 net securities gains were \$64.4 million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$49.5 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$14.4 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$0.5 million.

### **Balance Sheet Highlights**

Total assets as of June 30, 2007 were \$21.06 billion, up 4% from total assets of \$20.27 billion at December 31, 2006. The increase was primarily driven



by cash generated from operations during the period, partially offset by a decrease in unrealized gains in the investment portfolio due to a rise in long-term interest rates.

As of June 30, 2007, stockholders' equity was \$6.04 billion, a 2% decrease from year-end 2006 stockholders' equity of \$6.18 billion. The decrease was primarily the result of the \$400 million share buyback and lower Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income driven by higher long-term interest rates, partially offset by net income during the period.

During the second quarter 2007, Ambac completed the buyback of \$400 million of its common stock under its accelerated share buyback program (originally announced on February 12, 2007). The total number of shares purchased under the agreement amounted to 4.46 million shares. Ambac also bought back 194 thousand shares of its common stock at a total cost of \$16.9 million during the second quarter that was unrelated to the accelerated share buyback program.

56. Upon this partial disclosure on July 26, 2007, Ambac's stock collapsed \$3.85 per share to close at \$75.56 per share, a one-day decline of 5% on volume of 4 million shares, 3 times the average three-month volume.

57. On August 10, 2007, Ambac issued a press release entitled "Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Provides Additional Disclosures on Its Web Site Related to Collateralized Debt Obligations of Asset-Backed Securities." The press release stated in part:

Ambac Financial Group, Inc. today announced that it has provided additional information on its web site...regarding its exposure to Collateralized Debt Obligations of Asset-backed Securities (CDOs of ABS"), including additional details of each transaction's underlying collateral composition, underlying collateral ratings, and overall transaction ratings.

In its July 25<sup>th</sup> conference call with investors, Ambac provided commentary and analysis with respect to its exposure to CDOs of ABS and its underwriting standards.

58. Upon this partial disclosure, on August 10, 2007, Ambac's stock lost another \$3.15 per share to close at \$62.99 per share, a one-day decline of 5% on volume of 4.7 million shares, 2 times the average three-month volume.

59. On October 10, 2007, the Company issued a press release entitled “Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Announced Estimate of Unrealized Mark-to-Market Loss on Its Credit Derivatives Portfolio.” The press release stated in part:

**Ambac Financial Group, Inc.** (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced the results of its third quarter fair value review of its outstanding credit derivative contracts. Ambac’s estimate of the fair value or “mark-to-market” adjustment for its credit derivative portfolio at September 30, 2007 amounted to an unrealized loss of \$743 million, pre-tax. The company expects to report a net loss per diluted share up to \$3.50 in the third quarter. Earnings measures reported by research analysts are on an operating basis and exclude the net income impact of mark-to-market gains and losses on credit derivative contracts, as well as certain other items. The company expects to report positive operating earnings<sup>(1)</sup> per diluted share between \$1.85 and \$1.90 in the third quarter.

Commenting on the estimated result, Ambac Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Robert J. Genader, stated, “While this unrealized loss is disappointing, it is important to note that Ambac’s credit derivative contracts are similar to our insurance policies in that neither is exposed to the liquidity risks that are typically embedded in standard derivative contracts.” Mr. Genader added, “While the turmoil in the structured finance markets has resulted in this unfavorable unrealized mark-to-market for the quarter, we have observed significantly improved market conditions for the industry and I am encouraged by the recent increased interest in our core financial guaranty product. Moreover, I remain confident in our underwriting abilities, credit standards and the transactions we have insured.”

Ambac Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Sean Leonard, noted, “Ambac does not view the current adjustments as predictive of future claims. Indeed, the average internal credit rating of our derivative portfolio is AA+ at September 30, 2007 and based on our recent analysis of the portfolio, management believes that the potential for material paid claims is very low. Importantly, the company’s claims paying resources, as prescribed by the rating agencies, are not impacted by mark-to-market adjustments.”

The company also expects to report the following for the third quarter of 2007: (i) loss provision of approximately \$20 million; (ii) estimated accelerated premiums from refundings, calls and other accelerations of approximately \$16 million; (iii) credit enhancement production of approximately \$430 million; and (iv) Ambac’s highly rated investment portfolios, which total to approximately \$19 billion, are expected to have net embedded unrealized gains of approximately \$100 million as of September 30, 2007.

Ambac is providing this preliminary information about its third quarter results prior to the scheduled earnings announcement date in light of the extreme

market events of recent months. Investors should not expect the company to provide information about the results of future quarters in advance of scheduled quarterly earnings announcement dates. In addition, investors should not expect the company to update the information provided in this release in advance of the scheduled announcement date for its third quarter.

60. On October 24, 2007, Ambac issued a press release, entitled “Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Announces Third Quarter Net Loss of (\$360.6) Million; Includes Previously Announced \$743 Million Unrealized Mark-to-market Loss on Credit Derivative Portfolio; Third Quarter Net Loss Per Diluted Share of (\$3.51); Third Quarter Credit Enhancement Production of \$431.1 million, up 99%,” that stated in part:

**Ambac Financial Group, Inc.** (NYSE: ABK) (Ambac) today announced a third quarter 2007 net loss of (\$360.6) million, or (\$3.51) per diluted share. This compares to third quarter 2006 net income of \$213.5 million, or net income per diluted share of \$1.98. The decrease is due to the previously announced unrealized loss on credit derivative exposures amounting to (\$743.4) million, or (\$5.29) per diluted share in the third quarter 2007. The third quarter 2007 unrealized mark-to-market loss on credit derivative exposures was discussed in a press release dated October 10, 2007, and is primarily the result of unfavorable market pricing of collateralized debt obligations. As further described below, net mark-to-market losses on credit derivatives are excluded from the earnings measures used by research analysts.

#### **Net Income/(Loss) Per Diluted Share**

Net income/(loss) and net income/(loss) per diluted share are computed in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, many research analysts and investors do not limit their analysis of our earnings to a strictly GAAP basis. In order to assist investors in their understanding of quarterly results, Ambac provides other information.

Earnings measures reported by research analysts exclude the net income impact of net gains and losses from sales of investment securities and unrealized mark-to-market gains and losses on credit, total return and non-trading derivative contracts (collectively “net security gains and losses”) and certain other items. Certain research analysts and investors further exclude the net income impact of accelerated premiums earned on guaranteed obligations that have been refunded and other accelerated earnings (“accelerated earnings”). During the third quarter 2007, net security gains and losses had the effect of decreasing net income by (\$553.5) million, or (\$5.39) on a per diluted share basis. Accelerated earnings had

the effect of increasing net income by \$9.6 million, or \$0.10 per diluted share during the quarter. Table I provides third quarter and nine-month comparisons of earnings for 2007 and 2006.

\* \* \*

Commenting on the overall results, Ambac Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Robert J. Genader, noted, “We have observed improved overall market conditions in most asset classes of our core financial guaranty product, despite the recent turmoil in the structured finance markets. Business production during the quarter was quite robust, reflective of both a strong pipeline and better overall pricing in the current market.” Mr. Genader added, “With regard to the sizable mark-to-market adjustment recorded in the quarter, it is important to note that Ambac’s credit derivative contracts, like our insurance policies, are not exposed to the type of liquidity risk that is typically embedded in standard derivative contracts.”

### **Revenues Highlights**

*Credit enhancement production*<sup>(1)</sup> in the third quarter of 2007 was \$431.1 million, up 99% from Ambac’s production of \$216.2 million reported in the third quarter of 2006.

*Credit enhancement production* for the nine months of 2007 of \$1,109.1 million was 13% higher than credit enhancement production of \$980.7 million in the same period of 2006.

\* \* \*

### **Loss Reserve Activity**

Case basis loss reserves (loss reserves for exposures that have defaulted) increased \$59.8 million during the third quarter of 2007 from \$47.3 million at June 30, 2007 to \$107.1 million at September 30, 2007. The increased case reserves relate primarily to two RMBS transactions that are underperforming original expectations. Total net claim receipts during the quarter amounted to \$3.7 million.

Active credit reserves (“ACR”) are established for probable and estimable losses due to credit deterioration on certain adversely classified insured transactions. The ACR decreased by \$37.0 million during the quarter, from \$203.7 million at June 30, 2007 to \$166.7 million at September 30, 2007. The reserve decline was driven by net favorable credit activity, primarily within the public finance portfolio, partially offset by increased reserves within the RMBS sector of the structured finance portfolio.

### **Other Items**



*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the third quarter of 2007 were (\$757.2) million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$4.2 million, net mark-to-market losses on credit and total return derivatives of (\$756.3) million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$5.1) million. During the quarter a net mark-to-market loss amounting to (\$743.4) million was recorded related to contracts executed in credit default format, primarily in our collateralized debt obligation exposures. The negative mark-to-market is driven by dramatically lower prices in certain structured finance asset classes. The lower prices were driven by uncertainty regarding the ultimate outcome of subprime losses. Reduced demand for certain structured asset classes, a lack of liquidity in the markets, forced selling by structured and/or leveraged investment vehicles, all combined to exacerbate pricing declines across the structured debt capital markets.

For the third quarter of 2006, net securities gains/(losses) were \$9.9 million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$7.9 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$2.1 million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$0.1) million.

*Total net securities gains/(losses)* for the first nine months of 2007 were (\$806.0) million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$12.0 million, net mark-to-market losses on credit and total return derivatives of (\$816.0) million and net mark-to-market losses on non-trading derivative contracts of (\$2.0) million. For the first nine months of 2006 net securities gains were \$74.4 million, consisting of net realized gains on investment securities of \$57.5 million, net mark-to-market gains on credit and total return derivatives of \$16.5 million and net mark-to-market gains on non-trading derivative contracts of \$0.4 million. Approximately \$51 million of the 2006 net realized gains on investment securities related to cash recoveries received during the year related to a security in the investment agreement portfolio that had been written down in previous years.

### **Balance Sheet Highlights**

Total assets as of September 30, 2007 were \$21.97 billion, up 8% from total assets of \$20.27 billion at December 31, 2006. The increase was primarily driven by cash generated from operations during the period, partially offset by a decrease in unrealized gains in the investment portfolio due to a rise in long-term interest rates.

As of September 30, 2007, stockholders' equity was \$5.65 billion, a 9% decrease from year-end 2006 stockholders' equity of \$6.18 billion. The decrease was primarily the result of the \$400 million share buyback earlier in the year and lower Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income driven by higher long-term interest rates.

61. Upon this partial disclosure on October 24, 2007, Ambac's stock collapsed \$4.90 per share to close at \$51.00 per share, a one-day decline of 9% on volume of 10.8 million shares, 3 times the average three-month volume. Ambac's stock continued its free-fall the following day as the news continued to seep into the market, closing down another \$7.05 per share to close at \$43.95 per share, a one-day decline of 14% on volume of 16.4 million shares, over 4 times the average three-month volume. In total, upon this revelation, Ambac's stock closed down \$11.95 per share, a two-day decline of 21% on extremely high volume.

62. Thereafter, in the next couple of weeks, as more of the truth about Ambac's financials and business outlook emerged, more of the artificial inflation in the Company's stock came out and the stock dropped even more.

63. On October 26, 2007, Moody's cut the ratings on CDOs tied to \$33 billion of subprime mortgage securities. In some cases, CDOs with ratings as high as AAA were either cut or put on review for downgrade.

64. On October 29, 2007, Fitch announced that it had completed a comprehensive review of its CDOs and as a result it was placing 150 transactions tied to a \$36.8 billion on Ratings Watch Negative, including CDOs with AAA ratings. The following day, Fitch announced that it would be revising its entire methodology for rating CDOs and indicated that it expected to publish the new methodology the following week.

65. On November 1, 2007, Fitch announced that due to the deterioration in the subprime market the U.S. Corporate bond downgrades hit their highest quarterly level in two years – downgrades totaled \$92.1 billion in the third quarter of 2007. According to Fitch, Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch had cut ratings on approximately 7,800

bonds backed by residential mortgage backed securities sold in 2006 and had cut ratings on another 3, 700 bonds sold in 2005 and 2007.

66. Further, on November 1, 2007, Ambac's bonds were downgraded to "deteriorating" from "stable" by bond research firm Gimme Credit Productions Inc. due to Ambac's exposure to CDOs. The downgrade was based upon the recent ratings cuts made by the credit-ratings companies for the mortgage-backed bonds and CDOs. As *Bloomberg* reported:

"The share drop in the stock price at MBIA and Ambac raises questions about whether the turmoil in the markets is hurting franchise value," said Kathleen Shanley, an analyst in Chicago at [bond research firm] Gimme Credit, in an e-mail. "The financial guarantee business relies heavily on the confidence of investors that the guarantees will be money-good, and if clients begin to doubt this premise, there will be negative implications for the new business outlook going forward."

Ambac has insured about \$29 billion of CDOs whose assets are more than a quarter mortgage-backed securities, "relatively more" than MBIA...Gimme Credit said in a report today. CDOs are created by packaging bonds, loans or derivatives and using their income to pay investors.

67. Upon this news, Ambac's shares lost another \$7.26 per share to close at \$29.57 per share, a one-day decline of 20% on volume of 23.7 million shares, over 5.5 times the average three-month volume.

68. On November 2, 2007, further based upon the slew of downgrades of CDOs by the credit rating agencies and other recent industry news, including the announcement of massive write-downs by companies associated with Ambac, Morgan Stanley lowered the financial guarantee industry to "in-line" from "attractive" and Goldman Sachs cut its rating on Ambac to "neutral" from "buy." The Morgan Stanley

report raised concerns that additional losses at Ambac could force the Company to raise capital to protect its AAA rating.

69. Upon this news, Ambac's shares collapsed losing another \$6.06 per share to close at \$23.51 per share, a one-day decline of 20.5% on volume of 29.9 million shares, over 7 times the average three-month volume.

70. On November 5, 2007, Fitch announced its new methodology in assessing financial guarantors CDOs and further announced that it would be reviewing the capital of the monolines, including Ambac, to ensure that they have enough capital to warrant their AAA rating. As a result of the outgoing review, Ambac faced a "moderate" risk of falling beneath the capital requirements necessary to keep its AAA rating, which would result in either a potential ratings downgrade or forcing the Company to raise more capital. The review was expected to last six weeks.

71. On November 6, 2007, in an attempt to keep Ambac's stock from free falling, the Company issued a press release entitled "Ambac's Response to Morgan Stanley's Report On Financial Guarantors – Dated November 2, 2007," which stated in part:

**"Questions Arise on Mark to Market Losses"**

On page 6 the analyst states, "One of the first negative surprises we saw last week stemmed from the large discrepancy between the mark-to-market losses reported by the financial guarantors and Merrill Lynch."

**Management Comment:**

It is difficult for us to comment on the Merrill Lynch mark-to-market loss as we do not have any visibility into their transactions. Without such details on Merrill's book, one can only speculate as to the differences in the portfolios.

Several differences may exist between exposures contained in Ambac's portfolio and an investment bank's portfolio and therefore may influence the estimated mark of the different portfolios. For example, we have noted that later vintage



high-grade ABS CDOs (particularly those with 2007 and late 2006 vintage underlying collateral) and high-grade ABS CDOs that have large inner CDO components, have suffered more severe mark-to-market losses. Additionally, as one might expect, the amount of first loss subordination and credit migration triggers present in a structure also can impact the market value of the senior tranche. Finally, the terms of the contract may also impact the estimate of fair value. Ambac's Credit Default Swap ("CDS") contracts are highly modified from a standard CDS used by investment banks. Ambac CDS contracts do not include collateral posting provisions, and are generally limited to payment shortfalls of interest and principal. Ambac's contract terms are significant variations from standard CDS contracts and have significant value, particularly in difficult markets. In fact, certain investment banks will not enter into an Ambac CDS due to the favorable nature (towards Ambac) of its terms.

Some background on Ambac's mark-to-market follows. The mark-to-market unrealized loss is an estimate of our CDS contracts' "fair value". It is an estimate because our CDS contract does not trade in any market. Under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, CDS contracts must be recorded at fair value. Fair value is defined broadly as the price that a contract could be settled in a current transaction between willing parties, other than in a forced or liquidation sale.

Because an estimate of fair value of a CDS contract includes many market factors, an unrealized loss may not result in an increased expectation of loss. A good example of this dynamic is a general decline in the level of liquidity (witnessed by fewer buyers in the market) for a particular asset or asset class. Ambac believes that only through rigorous analytics of the actual transaction and its attributes and protections, as well as performance to date and expected future performance of underlying collateral, will one obtain meaningful information on the potential for actual losses.

Most all-major financial institutions are struggling with this issue. Particularly institutions where the process of marking-to-market is a critical part of operations, such as those that need to calculate required collateral postings. We are subject to information that we receive from market participants, which are primarily comprised of major investment banking institutions. Given the lack of liquidity in the market, the potential for CDO downgrading activity by the rating agencies, the potential for forced selling by other investors (due to downgrades), and the overall uncertainty surrounding the ultimate outcome of the subprime mortgage market, Ambac does expect significant volatility in the mark-to-market of its CDO portfolio for the foreseeable future.

#### **"CDO Downgrades Have Started"**

On pages 6 and 7, the analyst discusses the recent internal rating downgrades of certain ABS CDOs. He states "If they were to downgrade the securities further, we would be highly disappointed and expect investor confidence in management to be strained."

**Management Comment:**

Ambac has a rigorous surveillance process surrounding its entire book of business. Management has subjected the mortgage and ABS CDO books to more frequent and more detailed reviews in the current environment. We believe this is prudent and responsible given the current stressed credit environment surrounding the mortgage market. While Ambac underwrites its transactions to withstand significant stress, the underlying credit rating is impacted by expected unfavorable collateral performance. To date, the downgrades noted in the subject transactions are within the parameters of Ambac's original stress tests. Ambac's independent Surveillance and Risk Management group determine the deal ratings. The ratings are based on the performance observed to date and a projection of future performance of the underlying collateral. Given the significant stress in the mortgage market, it should not be surprising that there have been downgrades. We are highly confident in our ratings process. Over time, as new information becomes available and as performance data is analyzed, we will adjust ratings up or down accordingly.

**"Increasing Our Expectation of CDO Losses"**

The analyst states, "We are increasing our CDO loss expectations for both Ambac and MBIA to reflect an updated tally of various market opinions about cumulative subprime losses."

**Management Comment:**

It appears that the "various market opinions" referred to in the analyst's report relate to the 2006 and early 2007 vintage subprime. It also appears that he is assuming that the Ambac ABS CDO book will reflect the performance of the ABX index of 2006 and 2007 vintage subprime collateral and ignores the actual vintage diversification and asset quality triggers inherent in Ambac's book. We see wide differences in the market regarding the estimate of ultimate cumulative loss for the 2006 and early 2007 vintage. We typically hear a range from 8% to 17% with a wide dispersion around the mean. We understand the three major rating agencies are projecting a range of 10% to 14%. One of the rating agencies recently reported estimates with significant differences dependent upon vintage. There were notable differences between the first half of 2006 and more recent vintages. We believe this is a critical point that is missed by simply applying a broad 15% estimated cumulative loss across the book of business. It does not compensate for vintage dispersion inherent in our transactions, nor does it factor in different rating and FICO segmentation. Additionally, many of the ABS CDOs contain 2005 vintage mortgages, including Ambac transactions that were underwritten in 2007. That vintage is performing significantly better than 2006 and 2007. This illustrates the over simplification of applying a single cumulative loss across the board.

**"Becoming More Conservative with Capital"**

The analyst states, "We can not help but think that if management truly believed losses are unlikely, they would be willing to make a stronger statement with how they manage their capital (i.e. increased share buybacks)."

**Management Comment:**

As management has stated many times in the past, Ambac manages its capital levels to a triple-A standard. That requires us to be very cautious with capital levels, particularly in times of credit stress. For instance, a transaction rated AA will attract more capital than a similar transaction rated AAA. It is unlikely claims will be paid under either transaction. The global capital markets and virtually all major financial institutions are in the midst of a major credit and liquidity crunch. There is uncertainty regarding the ultimate outcome of losses in the U.S. mortgage market, concerns over leveraged investment vehicles and overall concern that the problems surrounding the mortgage market will adversely impact other sectors of the economy. Such an environment has caused credit spreads in many sectors to widen significantly. This environment provides both opportunities and limitations for Ambac. With regard to opportunities, returns on business written are up sharply in many sectors and we have seen a notable increase in attractive opportunities to put our capital to work for our shareholders. With regard to limitations, the market environment has caused some fixed income investors to have increased concern about the financial guaranty industry. As a result, all of the major participants in the industry have seen their credit spreads widen significantly. We believe applying capital to high return business and at the same time maintaining a stronger balance sheet by holding off on share repurchases is a responsible course in the current environment and one that meets our objective of managing our capital consistent with a triple-A standard. We believe this prudent strategy is good for both our equity and fixed income investors and will help restore confidence in our industry.

**Summary comments:**

We certainly understand the heightened concerns summarized in the analyst's report. Most all participants in the financial markets, including Ambac have a heightened concern over the ultimate outcome of the U.S. mortgage market. However, we are confident in the quality of our internal credit ratings process. We have been very transparent to the market and our investors by disclosing significant detail on our direct mortgage and CDO exposure in our various public disclosures. We have a rigorous and current review and rating process in place and we will react quickly as projected collateral performance changes.

72. This release calmed the market somewhat and Ambac's stock closed on November 6, 2007 at \$27.99 per share.



73. On November 8, 2007, Moody's announced that it intended to conduct a similar review of the capital of the monolines and that as a result Ambac faced a "moderate" risk of falling behind the capital requirements and risked potential ratings downgrade.

74. Finally, on November 27, 2007, executives from Ambac, including defendant Leonard, spoke at Banc of America securities bond insurer conference. At the conference, Ambac announced that it was considering raising capital through reinsurance or sales of debt or stock in order to maintain the Company's AAA rating.

75. Upon this news, Ambac's shares once again collapsed, losing another \$2.23 per share to close at \$21.79 per share, a one-day decline of 9.3% on volume of 12.3 million shares, approximately twice the average three-month volume. *The price represented the lowest closing price in Ambac's stock in over a decade.*

76. The statements above made by defendants were materially false and misleading when made for the following reasons:

(a) The Company lacked requisite internal controls to ensure that the Company's underwriting standards and its internal rating system for its CDO contracts were adequate, and as a result, the Company's projections and reported results issued during the Class Period were based upon defective assumptions and/or manipulated facts;

(b) The Company's financial statements were materially misstated due to its failure to properly account for its mark-to-market losses;

(c) Given the deterioration and the increased volatility in the mortgage market, the Company would be forced to tighten its underwriting standards related to its



asset-backed securities, which would have a direct material negative impact on its premium production going forward;

(d) The Company had far greater exposure to anticipated losses and defaults related to its CDO contracts containing subprime loans, including even highly rated CDOs, than it had previously disclosed;

(e) Defendants' Class Period statements about the Company's selective underwriting practices during the 2005 through 2007 time frame related to its CDOs backed by subprime assets were patently false; the Company's underwriting standards were at best aggressive and at minimum were completely inadequate.

77. As a result of defendants' false statements, Ambac's stock price traded at inflated levels during the Class Period, allowing defendants to sell some \$68 million worth of their Ambac stock at inflated prices. However, after the above revelations seeped into the market, the Company's shares were hammered by massive sales, sending them down more than 77% from their Class Period and all time high of \$96.08 per share in May 2007.

### **INSIDER TRADING**

78. The Individual Defendants made considerable insider trades while Ambac's stock price was artificially inflated due to their false statements, as demonstrated below:

<b>Name</b>	<b>Dates of Sales</b>	<b>Shares Sold</b>	<b>Proceeds</b>
Gandolfo	05/03/06-02/09/07	21,625	\$1,891,577

Genader	11/02/05-04/27/07	314,832	\$26,424,441
Lassiter	11/07/05-02/22/07	487,159	\$40,569,282
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>823,616</b>	<b>\$68,885,300</b>

**DEFENDANTS ACTED WITH SCIENTER**

79. Each misrepresentation and/or omission of material fact alleged herein was made with reckless disregard for the truth, or knowledge of its falsity and misleading nature. At all relevant times, each Defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the liability Ambac faces as a result of the actions detailed herein. Further, each Defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that they were deceiving the investing public regarding Ambac's prospects and business and artificially inflating the price of Ambac securities. Thus, the misrepresentations detailed herein were made with Defendant's knowledge, or with deliberate recklessness.

80. The true facts, which were known by the defendants but concealed from the investing public during the Class Period, were as follows:

(a) The Company lacked requisite internal controls to ensure that the Company's underwriting standards and its internal rating system for its CDO contracts were adequate, and, as a result, the Company's projections and reported results issued during the Class Period were based upon defective assumptions and/or manipulated facts;

(b) The Company's financial statements were materially misstated due to its failure to properly account for its mark-to-market losses;

(c) Given the deterioration and the increased volatility in the mortgage market, the Company would be forced to tighten its underwriting standards

related to its asset-backed securities, which would have a direct material negative impact on its premium production going forward.

(d) The Company had far greater exposure to anticipated losses and defaults related to its CDO contracts containing subprime loans, including even highly rated CDOs, than it had previously disclosed.

(e) The Company had far greater exposure to a potential ratings downgrade from one of the credit ratings agencies than it had previously disclosed; and

(f) Defendants' Class Period statements about the Company's selective underwriting practices during the 2005 through 2007 time frame related to its CDOs backed by subprime assets were patently false; the Company's underwriting standards were at best aggressive and at a minimum were completely inadequate.

#### **FRAUD ON THE MARKET ALLEGATIONS**

70. At all relevant times, the market for Ambac securities was an efficient market for the following reasons, among others:

- a. At all relevant times during the Class Period, Ambac's common stock was listed and actively traded either over the counter or on the NASDAQ GS, a highly efficient National Market.
- b. As a registered and regulated issuer of securities, Ambac filed periodic reports with the SEC, in addition to the frequent voluntary dissemination of information described in this Complaint.

- c. The Company's stock was followed by numerous financial analysts. Thus, the Company's stock reflected the effect of information disseminated in the market.

71. As a result of the above, the market for Ambac securities promptly digested current information with respect to the Company from all publicly available sources and reflected such information in the securities' prices. Under these circumstances, all purchasers of Ambac securities during the Class Period suffered similar injury through their purchase of securities at prices which were artificially inflated by Defendants' misrepresentations and omissions. Thus, a presumption of reliance applies.

#### **INAPPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR**

72. The statutory safe harbor for certain forward-looking statements does not apply to the misrepresentations and omissions alleged in this complaint. Many of the statements were not specifically identified as "forward-looking statements" when made. To the extent that there were any properly identified forward-looking statements, there were no meaningful cautionary statements identifying the important, then-present factors that could and did cause actual results to differ materially from those in the purportedly forward-looking statements. Alternatively, to the extent that the statutory safe harbor does apply to any forward-looking statements pleaded herein, Defendants are nonetheless liable because at the time each of the misrepresentations was made, the particular speakers knew that the statement was false or misleading at that time.

73. Any warnings or other cautionary language contained in the press releases and other public statements described herein were generic, "boilerplate" statements of



risk that would affect any similar company, and misleadingly contained no factual disclosure of any of the problems with the Company which placed the ability of the Company to accurately depict its own financial situations into serious question. As such, any forward-looking statements complained of herein were not accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.

74. Any relevant purported risk disclosures were, in fact, false and misleading in and of themselves, by virtue of the fact that the events which the risk disclosures purported to warn against as contingencies had frequently already become a reality or a certainty.

### **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

#### **COUNT I**

#### **(Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants)**

75. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges all preceding paragraphs though fully set forth herein.

76. During the Class Period, Defendants engaged in a plan, scheme, and course of business which operated as a fraud upon Plaintiff and Class Members, and made various untrue statements of material fact and omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading to Plaintiff and other Class Members as set forth above. The purpose and effect of this scheme was to induce Plaintiffs and members of the Class to purchase the Company's securities during the Class Period at artificially inflated prices.

77. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants knowingly or recklessly violated § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder in that they

themselves or a person whom they controlled: (a) employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon Plaintiff and other members of the Class in connection with their purchases of the Company's securities during the Class Period.

78. As a result of the foregoing, the market price of the Company's securities was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the false and misleading nature of the representations described above, Plaintiff and other members of the Class relied, to their detriment, directly on the misstatements or the integrity of the market both as to price and as to whether to purchase these securities. Plaintiff and other members of the Class would not have purchased Ambac stock at the prices they paid, or at all, if they had been aware that the market prices had been artificially and falsely inflated by Defendants' false and misleading statements and omissions. At the time of the purchase of Ambac securities by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, the fair market value of said securities was substantially less than the prices paid. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered substantial damages as a result.

**COUNT II**  
**(Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants)**

79. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

80. The Individual Defendants are liable for the material misrepresentations and omissions complained of herein under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act in that they

functioned as control persons of Ambac by virtue of their executive and directorial positions with Ambac, their knowledge and involvement in the business of the Company, their daily access to confidential information regarding the operations and finances of the Company, and their power and ability to make public statements on behalf of Ambac to shareholders, potential investors, and the media. As such, they had the power and ability to control the Company's actions.

### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of the Class, prays for judgment as follows:


1. Declaring this action to be a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the Class defined herein;
2. Awarding Plaintiff and members of the Class recissory or compensatory damages in an amount which may be proven at trial, together with interest thereon;
3. Awarding Plaintiff and the members of the Class pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as well as their reasonable attorneys' fees and expert witness fees and other costs; and
4. Awarding such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper including any extraordinary equitable relief and/or injunctive relief as permitted by law or equity to attach, impound or otherwise restrict the Defendants' assets to assure Plaintiff and the members of the Class have an effective remedy.

**JURY DEMAND**

Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial.

Dated: February 7, 2008,  
New York, New York

**LABATON SUCHAROW LLP**

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*Counsel for Plaintiff*



## **Exhibit A**

**PLAINTIFF CERTIFICATION**

I, Marko Babic, hereby declare that:

1. I have reviewed a draft Complaint in this class action and have authorized the filing thereof.
2. I did not purchase (or otherwise acquire) or sell securities of Ambac Financial Group, Inc. ("Ambac") the subject of the Complaint, at the direction of my counsel or in the hope to participate in any private action arising under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

3. I am willing to serve as a representative plaintiff on behalf of the class defined in the Complaint, including providing testimony at deposition and trial, if necessary.

4. I have engaged in the following transactions involving the securities of Ambac:

<u>Purchases</u>	<u>Trade Date</u>	<u>Price Per Security</u>	<u>Total</u>
20 @ 105	11/1/2007	\$105/contract	2,100 + 23 comm'n
20 @ 160	11/1/2007	\$160/contract	3,200 + 23 comm'n

<u>Sales</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Price Per Security</u>	<u>Total</u>
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expired worthless Jan. 19, '08


5. During the last three years preceding the date of this Certification, I have sought to serve as a representative plaintiff on behalf of a class in the following actions brought under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:

6. I will not accept any payment for serving as a representative plaintiff on behalf of the class beyond my pro rata share of any recovery, except as ordered by the Court.

7. Nothing herein shall be construed to be or constitute a waiver of my attorney-client privilege.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on the 2 day of February, 2008.

  
Marko Babic